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FIGHTING BLIGHT THROUGH INNOVATIVE FINANCING: 
An Examination of Social Impact Bonds
Executive Summary
In spring 2014, The New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA) requested 
that the UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team 
research creative funding mechanisms to finance the upfront investments 
required for large-scale blight reduction efforts. Specifically, NORA tasked the 
study team with identifying mechanisms to finance the title clearance services 
necessary for property disposition and the infrastructure investments required 
to implement cost-reducing alternative land management strategies for 310 
properties. Our analysis found that of these 310 properties, NORA acquired 
295 through expropriation and 15 through adjudication.
This report presents NORA with four distinct strategies for the effective dispo-
sition of these 310 properties, two of which involve the use of a relatively new 
financial instrument known as a Social Impact Bond (SIB).  SIBs are not tra-
ditional, fixed-rate-and-term security bonds such as municipal bonds; rather, 
SIBs more closely resemble a rigorous, performance-based contract between 
multiple parties, that combines aspects of both debt and equity.  Unlike perfor-
mance-based contracts, SIBs use private investment to fund the upfront costs, 
and reduce the burden placed on taxpayers, of preventative services that de-
liver long-term cost savings. Although SIBs have been used for people-based 
programs, our research suggests that the model’s flexibility potentially allows 
for its application to place-based programs such as blight remediation. After 
conducting a spatial analysis of the characteristics of NORA’s lots, we divided 
these 310 properties into groups based on their physical features and the 
market conditions of the neighborhoods in which they are located. We present 
the following four strategies for the sale or effective transfer of these lots from 
NORA to private entities:
Strategy I – Title Clearance for Sale at Auction
The purpose of this strategy is to clear titles to properties in relatively strong 
markets, so that NORA can sell these properties at auction.  We identified this 
strategy as appropriate for 43 expropriated properties in census blocks with 
relatively strong market demand. Through an analysis of blight remediation 
efforts in other cities and conversations with local title attorneys, we estimate 
that title clearance costs for expropriated properties will generally average 
$17,000.  SIB financing is not suitable to fund the upfront title clearance costs 
in this particular strategy, given the limited social benefit of returning blighted 
properties in relatively strong real estate markets to private individuals; we 
therefore recommend that NORA consider using a performance-based con-
tract to finance this strategy. Through this financing model, NORA could pay 
the title agency responsible for clearing the titles to these lots with the income 
that the sale of these properties generates. This strategy will result in pro-
grammatic income for NORA as well as long term cost savings, while also 
contributing to NORA’s mission of neighborhood revitalization.
Strategy II –Clustered Redevelopment
Although SIB-financing is not appropriate for title clearance alone, our re-
search and analysis indicates NORA could potentially use SIB funding to 
finance catalytic redevelopment projects in transitional markets. This strat-
egy, clustered redevelopment, is best suited for concentrations of expropri-
ated properties in markets where there is not enough demand for NORA to 
reasonably expect to auction off the properties on a piecemeal basis, even if 
they had clear titles, but where a strategically-placed development could spur 
neighborhood revitalization.  We identified 48 properties in four distinct clus-
ters (located in the Broadmoor/Central City, Algiers/Whitney, Desire/St. Roch, 
and Florida/St. Claude neighborhoods) as appropriate for this strategy. These 
clusters also overlap with the City of New Orleans’s current place-based 
redevelopment efforts.  The sale of these properties at a discounted rate to a 
development partner would cover the title clearance costs of these properties 
while also providing a social investor with an estimated return on investment 
of almost 5%.
Strategy III – Stormwater Management
Stormwater management calls for a partnership between NORA and the Sew-
erage and Water Board (S&WB), in which NORA transfers 43 expropriated 
vacant properties in areas with a high risk of flooding to the S&WB. Through a 
SIB, the S&WB and private investors would finance the construction of storm-
water infrastructure on these lots. The S&WB is currently operating under an 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) consent decree requiring it to spend 
$2 million to improve water quality. This spending requirement, in addition 
to the long term cost savings generated through stormwater management, 
serves as the S&WB’s incentive for program participation. A SIB partnership 
between NORA and the S&WB could provide the opportunity for NORA to 
reduce its maintenance responsibility for vacant properties and for the S&WB 
to meet the goals mandated in the consent decree.
Strategy IV – Lot Leasing
The final strategy calls for the expansion of NORA’s Growing Green program, 
by incentivising the green intermediary to expand the scale of the program. 
By allowing the green intermediary to share in the income and cost savings 
generated by lot leasing, NORA can take the Growing Green program to 
scale and reduce the agency’s maintenance costs. We identified 157 proper-
ties suitable for lot leasing, clustered in the Lower Ninth Ward/ Holy Cross 
neighborhoods and the McDonough neighborhood.  As in Strategy I, NORA 
can finance this program through a performance-based model in which 
NORA pays the green intermediary group a percentage of the revenues and 
cost savings generated by shifting the land banking and maintenance respon-
sibility for these lots to community groups. We estimate that over 10 years 
this strategy could produce over $800,000 in net savings and income for the 
agency, whereas NORA’s current practice of maintaining and insuring these 
lots is projected to cost almost $900,000 during the same period. 
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In 2012, the City of New Orleans possessed almost 36,000 vacant or blighted 
properties, making it one of the most blighted cities in the nation.1  While 
public officials, community groups, developers, and other stakeholders have 
made substantial progress in returning blighted properties to the private real 
estate market, many New Orleans neighborhoods remain littered with blighted 
homes and vacant lots.  The New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA), 
charged with the maintenance and redevelopment of approximately 2,600 
vacant or blighted properties, plays a substantial role in the revitalization 
of the city.  NORA, a quasi-governmental agency that relies primarily on 
federal grant funding to finance its operations, has some powers typically 
associated with government agencies including the authority to issue bonds 
and expropriate properties. While its quasi-governmental status provides 
NORA with some insulation from the electoral politics and special interests 
that can interfere with public blight remediation strategies, it also places 
NORA in a precarious funding situation relative to public agencies that 
receive a dedicated millage in the city’s property tax system. With federal 
disaster recovery funds dwindling, NORA is now seeking new and innovative 
strategies to fund neighborhood revitalization and blight elimination.
NORA has requested that the UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance 
Capstone Study Team (to be referred to as the study team) research creative 
funding mechanisms to finance the upfront investments required for large-
scale blight reduction efforts. Specifically, NORA has tasked the study team 
with identifying mechanisms to finance the title clearance services necessary 
for property disposition and the infrastructure investments required to 
implement cost-reducing alternative land management strategies for 310 
properties. These properties are distinct from other lots in NORA’s inventory 
in that NORA did not acquire them through the Road Home Program via the 
Louisiana Land Trust (LLT)—a non-profit organization formed to manage the 
properties purchased by the state under the Road Home Program.2 These 
non-Louisiana Land Trust (non-LLT) properties present some challenges—
most notably, with regard to the status of their titles—the LLT properties do 
not.  
 
1 Plyer, A., & Ortiz, E. (2012). Benchmarks for blight: How much blight does New Or-
leans have? Accessed, March 3rd, 2014. Available: http://www.datacenterresearch.org/
reports_analysis/benchmarks-for-blight
2 Louisiana Land Trust. Accessed, May 3rd, 2014. Available: from http://www.lalandtrust.
us/
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NORA requested specific analysis on a relatively new financial instrument 
known as a Social Impact Bond (SIB).  SIBs are not traditional, fixed-
rate-and-term security bonds such as municipal bonds; rather, SIBs more 
closely resemble a “rigorous, performance-based contract between multiple 
parties,” that combine aspects of both debt and equity.3  SIBs use private 
investment, whereas performance-based contracts use public investment, 
to fund programs that produce measurable social benefits and quantifiable 
cost savings to government agencies.  If the program meets pre-determined, 
standardized outcomes, the investors receive a return on their investment 
from the cost savings to the government.  The private investment in SIBs 
makes them more attractive to municipalities since, unlike performance-based 
contracts, less burden is placed on taxpayers.  To date, SIBs have been used 
solely for people-based programs, such as recidivism reduction services 
and preschool education.  The use of SIBs to finance blight remediation is 
currently untested in the United States. This report will provide an overview of 
the possible operations of such a program.
Over the past few months, the study team performed literature reviews, 
interviews, legislative analyses, and mapping analyses to inform our 
recommendations.  We looked at other communities facing similar problems, 
such as Detroit, Baltimore, and Cleveland, to identify best-practice strategies 
to combat blight. The study team also contacted agencies, organizations, 
and individuals involved in SIB-financing to obtain an in-depth understanding 
of how this innovative new tool could be used to combat blight and to assist 
NORA, specifically. (An inventory of SIB-financed projects is available in 
Appendix A).
Armed with the knowledge acquired during this research and analysis, we 
developed four distinct cost-reduction strategies. These strategies fall into 
two categories—disposition strategies and alternative land management 
strategies. Disposition strategies include title clearance for auction, and 
clustered redevelopment, while alternative land management strategies 
include stormwater management and lot leasing.  The study team has 
established specific criteria, and utilized Geographic Information System 
(GIS) mapping software to determine which NORA-owned properties were 
appropriate for each strategy. Finally, we determined financing mechanisms 
through which NORA could implement each approach.
3 Shah, S., & Costa, K. (2013). Social finance: A primer - understanding innovation 
funds, impact bonds, and impact investing. Washington, DC: Center for American 
Progress. p. 12
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In recent years, government budget deficits and shifting political priorities 
have resulted in policy makers either cutting or consolidating publicly-
funded social services such as public housing, healthcare, and education.4  
Foundations and other charitable organizations have a long history of 
providing the public with social services when government resources are 
stretched to capacity.  In our current era of public fiscal austerity, however, 
private for-profit entities and investors have become involved in the social 
service sector to an unprecedented degree.5  The influx of investor capital into 
traditionally public or philanthropically-funded social services is often called 
impact investing.  The “rise of the social or impact investor – where funders 
are interested in results and returns, both social and financial, on their capital,” 
has been well documented.6 The most recent trend in impact investing is an 
innovative finance mechanism called the Social Impact Bond (SIB).
SIBs leverage private investment to finance the delivery of preventive social 
services for which public agencies are unable to obtain adequate start-up 
capital, or for which current budgetary allocations do not provide the funding 
necessary to take an existing, proven program to scale.7  Again, SIBs are 
not traditional, fixed-rate-and-term security bonds such as municipal bonds; 
rather, SIBs more closely resemble a “rigorous, performance based contract 
between multiple parties,” that combines aspects of both debt and equity.8
In the most common SIB model, a government entity identifies a costly 
social problem and then enters into a contract with a private intermediary 
that works to attract investments and procure social service providers.9  
Since the government only pays for the projects after the program meets 
pre-determined, quantifiable outcomes, the intermediary obtains its initial 
operating budget—the funds that are used to pay the social service 
providers—from socially-minded private investors.10  If the program is indeed 
successful, it should result in public cost savings or revenue that the
4 Roman, J., & Walsh, K. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: Committee of the Whole Council 
of the District of Columbia. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
5 Clark, C. H., Massarsky, C., Raben, T., & Worsham, E. (2012). Scaling Social Impact:  
A Literature Toolkit for Investors. Growth Philanthropy Network and Duke University.
6          Ibid.
7 Liebman, J. & Sellman, A. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local  
Governments. Harvard Kennedy School.
8 Shah, S., & Costa, K. (2013). Social finance: A primer - understanding innovation 
funds, impact bonds, and impact investing. Washington, DC: Center for American 
Progress. p. 12
9 Liebman, J. & Sellman, A. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local 
Governments. Harvard Kennedy School.
10        Ibid.
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government entity uses to pay back the intermediary.  The intermediary then 
provides the private investors with a return on their investment.11
We describe how a SIB model functions below, through a discussion of the 
first SIB-funded program in the U.S.—an anti-recidivism program on Rikers 
Island referred to as the Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE).  
The full description of the ABLE case study, Case Study 1, is on page 19.
Social Impact Bond Structure
The diagram of the SIB model in Figure 1 illustrates how a SIB is used to 
finance a social program.  This section reviews the role that each entity plays 
in the model.
Figure 1: Standard Social Impact Bond Structure
11        Ibid.
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Government
Generally, the SIB process begins when a government agency identifies a 
social service or program that, if taken to scale, could result in measurable 
cost savings or revenue generation within a reasonable timeframe.12 In the 
ABLE case study, Case Study 1, for instance, the New York City’s Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS)—the government entity—sought to 
expand the scale of an existing and effective program—the ABLE program.13 
While relatively costly, ABLE had been demonstrably effective at reducing 
recidivism rates and public penal expenditures on a per prisoner basis.  DHHS 
and Mayor Bloomberg’s administration decided to pursue SIB financing in 
order to secure additional, upfront funding for the program. The goal was to 
increase the magnitude of its social and fiscal benefits, generating net savings 
over the course of just a few years.
Generally, governments are attracted to this method of financing because it 
allows them to bring proven programs to scale, and reduces the obstacles 
to funding financially-sound but politically difficult expenditures—such as a 
multi-million dollar investment in incarcerated people.  More specifically, if 
the program fails to produce the desired impact, the government entity is 
not required to repay the investors. As such, the model insures that local 
governments do not use public funds to finance ineffective programs, while 
also providing much needed funding to support expensive but effective 
policies. 
Intermediary
In the traditional SIB model, the government entity does not approach 
investors itself. Rather, it enters into a performance-based contract with 
an intermediary. The government entity identifies its goals and desired 
outcomes, and the intermediary is responsible for achieving those outcomes. 
It is therefore the intermediary that is responsible for identifying investors 
and obtaining the upfront investment necessary to fund programmatic 
operations. The intermediary acts as a middleman, setting performance-based 
12 Ibid.
13 The City of New York Office of the Mayor. (2012, August 2). Mayor Bloomberg,   
Deputy Mayor Gibbs, and Corrections Commissioner Schriro Announce Nation’s First  
Social Impact Bond Program. Accessed, February 12th, 2014. Available: http://www. 
goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/urban-investments/case-  
studies/social-impact-bond-pdf.pdf
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measurements, securing and accepting initial investments from the private 
sector, hiring and managing the service providers, and, eventually, receiving 
savings-generated payments that are returned to the private funders.  
Investors
Once the government entity engages an intermediary, the intermediary 
identifies an investor or investors to provide the necessary upfront financing.14 
Investment funds may come from a bank, a high net worth individual, a 
foundation, or a combination of several of these entities.15 As discussed 
previously, investors in SIBs tend to have dual motivations.  While they expect 
their investment to produce monetary returns, they are often willing to accept 
relatively high risks and low yields, in order to finance a program that has a 
positive social impact.16 17
The risk inherent in a SIB investment is greater than most investments, 
because the equity partner will lose his or her entire contribution if the 
program is unsuccessful.  In the ABLE example, Goldman Sachs invested 
$9.6 million in the prisoner rehabilitation program.  Unless the program 
successfully reduces recidivism by 10% over a 4-year period, Goldman Sachs 
will not receive its full investment.  It is important to note, however, Bloomberg 
Philanthropies guaranteed $7.2 million of Goldman Sachs’ investment via 
a grant in the program.  In this way, the SIB model allows the City of New 
York to leverage additional private financing using Bloomberg’s philanthropic 
investment. 
From the perspective of a foundational investor, the SIB model is highly 
attractive because the same grant can be used multiple times to leverage 
private financing and provide multiple rounds of social services.  If the ABLE 
program succeeds, Goldman Sachs will receive a return on its investment and 
Bloomberg Philanthropies can reinvest its $7.2 million in another round of the 
program or another social program.18
14 Shah & Costa
15 McKinsey & Company (2012). From action to potential: Bringing Social Impact   
Bonds to the US. Washington, DC: McKinsey and Company.
16 Ibid.
17 Clark, Massarsky, Raben, & Worsham
18 The City of New York Office of the Mayor
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Service Providers
Service providers are hired by intermediaries with investor funds to implement 
the social program.19  With the initial investment capital provided by private 
funders, service providers are tasked with managing programs or projects that 
contribute to the greater social good.  These programs realize savings to the 
government agency that initiated the SIB.
Social service providers are attracted to this model because they can develop 
working partnerships with government agencies, and because the program 
provides them with substantial upfront funding with which to implement 
their work.20  The type of service provider is dependent on the nature of the 
program.  For instance, service providers in the New York example included 
youth counseling and workforce training organizations.21  The upfront funding 
from Goldman Sachs allows counseling and training methods proven to 
reduce recidivism to be brought to scale.
Evaluators
The evaluator is an independent entity that measures the success of the 
project. The government agency determines measurable goals at the outset of 
the contract that to be evaluated by the evaluator. Intermediaries are then paid 
by their ability to achieve or surpass these goals.  The evaluator measures the 
goals of the program by comparing the outcomes of the social service relative 
to the outcomes of a comparison or control group without the services.22 
19 Liebman, J. & Sellman, A. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local  
Governments. Harvard Kennedy School.
20 Ibid.
21 The City of New York Office of the Mayor
22 Liebman, J. & Sellman, A. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local  
Governments. Harvard Kennedy School.
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Case Study 1: 
Fighting Adolescent 
Recidvism at Rikers Island
New York City is paving the way for SIBs in the U.S. In August 2012, the city launched the coun-
try’s first SIB with the goal of lowering the recidivism rate among adolescents at Rikers Island, 
the city’s main prison complex. The bond was initiated by the City of New York. Goldman Sachs 
structured a $9.6 million loan to MDRC, a social policy research organization, which acts as the 
intermediary. Bloomberg Philanthropies backed $7.2 million of that loan, reducing Goldman’s 
investment risk. MDRC hired the Osborne Association and Friends of Island Academy, two 
groups with proven track records of helping incarcerated youth, as the primary service providers 
and the Vera Institute of Justice to serve as the independent evaluator. 
Partnership Roles
Initiator: The City of New York
Service Providers: The Osborne Association, Friends of Island Academy
Intermediary: MDRC
Evaluator: The Vera Institute of Justice
Investors: Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg Philanthropies
Strategy
The program, officially called the Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE) Program, 
seeks to reduce recidivism among adolescents by 10% over a four year period. An initial invest-
ment, provided by Goldman Sachs, will fund the service providers. Once the service providers 
succeed in reducing the recidivism rate by 10%, the City of New York, with a newly realized 
stream of savings, makes payments to MRDC. MRDC, acting as intermediary, then returns 
these profits to Goldman Sachs. As a Community Redevelopment Act (CRA) financial institu-
tion, Goldman Sachs receives a CRA credit boost for operating within its own community.
Current Status
The SIB is in its second full year of the loan period. Initial results are still forthcoming.
Relevance to New Orleans Redevelopment Authority
This case study is relevant to NORA because it illustrates a typical, yet complex, SIB financial 
structure. The contract took two years to finalize and is an example of how a SIB financing 
structure can be very intricate and involve several partners. As the first SIB to be adopted in the 
U.S., the success of the program is crucial for the future of this unique financing model.
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Strengths of The Social Impact Bond Model
The SIB model improves upon existing governmental budgeting and 
evaluation processes for social programs by addressing several key 
weaknesses in the current model. First, governments often lack the upfront 
funds necessary to provide preventative services on a large scale, even if 
these services have demonstrated social and fiscal benefits.  SIB programs 
help solve this problem by using private investment to fund the initial program 
costs and then using the cost-savings generated by the program to refund the 
original investment.
Second, government programs and their evaluation metrics are often 
task-oriented rather than outcome-oriented. In other words, programs are 
evaluated in terms of people served or money spent, rather than how effective 
the public investment was at producing the desired outcome.23  This is largely 
due to the nature of the electoral cycle and the timeframe considered during 
the budgeting process. “Most budgets are built around funding the same 
things that were funded the previous year…and fear of public scrutiny makes 
it hard to take the risks associated with trying new things and then rigorously 
evaluating them.”24  Because the SIB model relies on private investors, the 
risk of failure—and thus the burden of quantifying success—shifts from the 
public sector to the private sector.  In this way, the SIB model has the dual 
effect of allowing the public sector to pursue more innovative social service 
mechanisms, while also insuring only proven programs receive public funding. 
Limitations of Social Impact Bonds
The SIB model is not without limitations.  First, the pool of potential investors 
is relatively limited.  The private equity partner in the SIB model may lose 
its entire investment.  Given this level of risk, the potential investor return 
is relatively modest.25  As such, only philanthropically minded investors, or 
those whose investments are backed by a philanthropic donation—such as 
Goldman Sachs in the Rikers example—have expressed substantial interest 
in SIBs, to date.
 
23       Liebman & Sellman 6
24 Ibid. 7
25 Fernandes, D. (2014, January 29). Goldman Sachs Buys ‘Social Impact’ Bonds. The  
Boston Globe.
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Second, compared to the direct provision of public services, or a two-
party contract between a government and a service provider, the SIB 
model is relatively complex.  This complexity, as explained in an interview 
with Sebastian Chaskel of the Harvard Kennedy School, makes SIBs 
approximately 30% more expensive than more traditional forms of bond 
financing.  SIBs present additional temporal costs and burdens as well.  The 
Rikers Island contract, according to Chaskel, took approximately two years 
from inception to closing.   
Third, although SIBs have been heralded as facilitating innovation in the 
public sector,26 the extent to which SIBs incentivize risk-taking is highly 
limited.  In order to mitigate risks, SIBs are generally used for programs with a 
proven track record. As such, they are highly constrained in the type of social 
programs they can finance.  Furthermore, private investors—not the public or 
elected officials—ultimately decide which programs are worthy of funding; this 
private influence over public spending also limits the type of programs SIBs 
can finance.
Finally, with the first U.S. SIB only halfway through the service provision 
phase, the SIB model’s most obvious weakness is that it is still relatively 
untested.27  Although there are European programs that have finished their 
first performance evaluation cycle, even these programs are still relatively 
nascent.  In this sense, there exists significant leeway within the SIB model 
for mistakes—and for opportunities. 
Best Practices In Social Impact Bond Financing
SIBs can be modeled in several different ways, depending on program goals 
and the specific problems a government agency faces in its work.  Appendix A 
of this report provides an inventory of existing SIB programs that identifies the 
entities involved under their respective contracts.  As indicated by the diverse 
set of SIB programs in the appendix, there is room for innovation within the 
SIB model.  Because a SIB is merely a contract for services, government 
agencies have significant flexibility in the financing structure they choose to 
implement.
26 Liebman & Sellman 6
27 The City of New York Office of the Mayor
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However, there are several criteria that can help to determine if SIB financing 
will help meet program goals (Table 1).  Despite the SIB model’s novelty, 
researchers and practitioners have constructed a loosely conceptualized 
framework of best practices in SIB financing to date. 
Table 1: Best Practices Framework for SIB Project Selection
SIB-financing works best for programs that deliver a preventative service—
one that may carry significant upfront costs, but delivers even greater future 
cost savings.28  It’s important, however, that future cost savings are high 
relative to initial costs.  The transaction costs in a SIB-model represent 
approximately 30% of the program’s costs. As such, only programs that 
generate high net benefits and public sector savings are suitable for SIB-
financing.29  An equally essential criterion is that the program or social service 
being funded produces measurable outcomes. 
The extent to which a program or service can deliver measurable outcomes 
is essential to the feasibility of SIB-financing. Programmatic success must 
be quantifiable to be relevant to investors.30  Furthermore, one of the primary 
benefits of the SIB model is its rigorous performance evaluation of social 
programs.  Rather than defining success as the number of people serviced by 
28  Liebman & Sellman
29  Shah & Costa
30  Ibid.
Project Selection Criteria Summary
Preventative Service Should generate cost savings in the long run
Potential for high net benefits and public 
sector savings
Project must have potential to bring real 
financial savings that can be used to repay 
investors
Measurable outcomes Agencies must select quantifiable social outcomes 
Credible impact assessments (a “but-for” 
test)
Intermediary must prove outcomes were the 
direct result of the intervention, and would 
not have occurred without it
    Sufficient sample sizes Part of criterion above
    Well-defined treatment population Part of criterion above
Reasonable timeframe Program should provide returns within 5-10 years
Safeguards for population The program (or its failure) will not harm the target population
Source: UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analysis
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a program—as many current social programs do—a SIB-financed program 
will define success by its outcomes.  In order to do so in a reliable way, these 
outcomes must be objective and quantifiable. 
To date, SIB structures in the U.S. have sought to emulate an experimental 
set-up.31  In this model, programmatic success is measured in terms of 
whether or not the target group demonstrates statistically significant rates of 
success relative to a control group.32  There are several mutually supportive 
criteria that must fit together for this quasi-experimental model to work.  First, 
such a model requires a well-defined treatment population.  The idea here is 
that the outcomes of the target group should be compared to the outcomes 
of a control group when evaluating the success of the SIB.  For this to work, 
the treatment population needs to be comparable, but distinct, from a non-
treatment population.  While this has proven relatively simple with recidivism-
based programs (in which a random selection of prisoners can go through 
the program, while another randomly selected group of prisoners does not), 
it can become more complicated with more nuanced SIB-programs, such as 
the Bristol Together and Midlands Together models discussed in Case Study 
2.  The other sub-component of this criterion is that of sample size.  In the 
U.S., SIB-financed programs have used target populations of a large enough 
sample size to establish causality.  The Harvard Kennedy School’s best 
practices handbook on SIB financing indicates that people-based programs 
should have a minimum of 200 participants.33 
The fifth primary criterion requires the program’s benefits accrue over a 
reasonable time frame.   While socially motivated investors may be willing 
to wait for a longer period of time to receive their returns or evaluate 
programmatic impacts than other types of investors, most experts agree SIB 
programs should structure their benefits to accrue within a five-year time 
frame.34 
Finally, if the service provider is delivering a vital service—such as essential 
health care, there need to be safeguards for the population. In such 
programs, if the program fails, individual citizens within the target population 
will suffer real harm. 
31 Chaskel, S. Harvard Kennedy School – Social Impact Bond Financing Lab. February  
26th, 2014. Phone interview. Interviewed by Karl Tear.
32 Liebman & Sellman
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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To date, Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have been used exclusively for people-
based programs in the U.S. There is, however, growing interest among 
local governments, consultants, and community development experts in 
using SIB financing to fund place-based programs.35, SIBs are an innovative 
but relatively untested method of providing governments with funding, and 
the application of SIBs to blight remediation programs creates additional 
uncertainty, not least because the combination is unprecedented. 
A strong case can be made for using SIBs to fund blight reduction programs. 
As this section will discuss, SIBs have garnered modest but growing levels of 
attention among real estate-focused community development professionals in 
the U.S. Moreover, at least one program in the United Kingdom (U.K.), called 
Bristol Together (detailed in Case Study 2), has successfully implemented 
an ongoing SIB-funded program that targets both people and places.36 
The Bristol Together model, which is also now in use in the Midlands, 
U.K., combines the costs and benefits of workforce training for formerly 
incarcerated people with those of blight remediation.37 
This section explores the feasibility of using SIBs for place-based programs, 
and finds that there is room within the SIB framework for blight remediation. 
These discussions lay the groundwork for identifying the means through which 
NORA, specifically, could use SIB financing to achieve its goals. 
The Cost of Blight
Blight is most often identified with rust-belt cities such as Detroit, but even 
Sunbelt cities such as Phoenix and Orlando are home to a growing inventory 
of vacant lots and abandoned properties following the foreclosure crisis of 
the mid-2000s.38 In a 2010 Brookings Institute survey of 60 mid-size to large 
cities, two in every 1,000 properties were reported as vacant.39 Across the 
country, blight places serious social and fiscal burdens on metropolitan areas. 
35 Muchin, K. (2013, June 14). Response to Illinois Request for Information: Social 
Impact Bonds - Community revitalization and blight remediation. Evanston, IL: BriCK 
Partners, LLC; Rogers, R. (2014, March 7). Richmond to explore new plan to fix 
blighted housing stock. Contra Costa Times; Roman, J. (2013, November 6). Social 
Impact  Bonds: A new model to reduce blight. The Huffington Post.
36 Bristol Together Community Interest Company. (2013). Bristol Together: Job creation  
for ex-offenders. Retrieved March 20, 2014, from http://www.bristoltogether.co.uk/ 
aboutus.htm
37 Ibid.
38 Hollander, J. (2011). Sunburnt cities: The Great Recession, depopulation, and urban  
planning in the American Sunbelt. New York, NY: Routledge.
39 Pagano, M.A. & O’Bowman. (2010). Vacant land in cities: An urban resource.   
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Center On Urban and Metropolitan Policy. p. 6.
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Foreclosed upon or otherwise abandoned properties fall into disrepair, and 
the presence of these unsightly and potentially unsafe lots or buildings leads 
to diminished demand for real estate in the surrounding area. This process is 
often self-reinforcing; blight leads to lower property values and less demand, 
which in turn causes property-owners to abandon or neglect their property, 
creating additional blight. Vacant lots can harbor crime and the presence of 
visibly neglected properties can undermine a community’s social cohesion 
and character. There are also several significant direct costs associated with 
blight. Blight’s fiscal costs include:
• The reduction in property tax revenue due to high rates of tax delinquency 
among owners of abandoned or vacant lots.
• The reduction in the property tax revenue generated by properties 
proximate to blight, which typically experience a decline in their property 
values and often fall into blighted conditions themselves.
• The complete loss of property tax revenue from blighted properties that fall 
into municipal ownership.
• The property maintenance costs that must be borne by the municipality for 
city-owned lots.40
The non-profit advocacy organization Smart Growth America summarizes 
these costs, stating that “managing vacant properties ties up the time of 
municipal employees and the resources of municipal taxpayers. At the same 
time, these properties depress the value of other properties and generate little 
or no tax revenue themselves.” 41
The Cost of Blight Remediation
Unfortunately, reducing blight is costly and successful outcomes are 
elusive. Cities that own properties acquired through adjudication or due to 
code-violations face multiple obstacles to putting the properties back into 
commerce, including solving costly title problems and liens. But it can also be 
difficult for municipalities to even consider investing in disposition or 
40 Smart Growth America. (2005). Vacant properties: The true cost to communities.   
Washington, DC: National Vacant Properties Campaign. Accessed March 10, 2014.  
Available: http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/true-costs.pdf
41 Ibid. p. 20
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redevelopment strategies when there is an immediate need to budget for the 
maintenance costs necessary to keep vacant lots up to code. 
The costs of blight remediation fall into two broad categories. The first 
category—redevelopment costs—consists of the costs associated with 
returning blighted properties to commerce. This is a particularly significant 
challenge in weak markets, which, almost by definition, are the types of 
markets or neighborhoods in which blight tends to be most prevalent. These 
costs include the time and money spent on clearing clouded titles, as well as 
the marketing or subsidy costs required to encourage people or organizations 
to purchase the properties once a clear title has been established.42
The second category consists of maintenance related costs. These include 
property maintenance expenditures such as grass mowing and insurance. 
This category can also include upfront investments in low-maintenance 
vegetation or other alternative land management strategies that will save the 
municipality money in the long run. 
 In the sense that these upfront costs deliver long-term benefits, blight 
remediation appears to be a feasible target for SIB financing. But certain 
characteristics of the SIB model, as it has been implemented to date, do not 
intuitively conform to the funding needs of blight redevelopment or creative 
land maintenance strategies. The next section of this report explores the 
potential use of SIBs for blight remediation in greater detail.
Blight Remediation as a SIB-financed Project
While the practicality of using SIBs for blight remediation depends largely 
on the blight remediation program itself, blight reduction inherently presents 
both obstacles and opportunities for incorporation into the SIB model. 
Indeed, some experts have expressed doubts regarding the viability of this 
combination.43 Concerns stem largely from the challenges associated with 
defining a treatment population and a control group—as one would do in 
a people-based program—and the associated problems with establishing 
causality. Other experts, however, have suggested that the power of SIB 
financing lies in its flexibility, not in the extent to which it mimics a controlled 
42 United States Conference of Mayors. (2008). Vacant and abandoned properties: Sur-
vey and best practices. Washington, DC: City Policy Associates.
43 Chaskel, S. Harvard Kennedy School – Social Impact Bond Financing Lab. February 
26th, 2014. Phone interview. Interviewed by Karl Tear.
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experiment. As one researcher knowledgeable on the subject stated, “SIBs 
are not a noun; they are a concept.”44 
The limiting factor for any project that relies on private funding is investor 
willingness. Despite their novelty, SIBs are no exception to this rule. This 
section explores how blight fits into the program-selection framework 
described in the previous section. It reveals that the opportunities associated 
with the natural overlap between real estate investment and bond-financing 
potentially offset the challenges associated with scale and measurement.
Is it a preventative service?
Conceptually, blight remediation is a preventative service in that the upfront 
costs associated with returning a blighted property to market or installing 
maintenance-cost reducing infrastructure can result in even greater cost 
savings over time. Furthermore, since the costs of rehabilitating blighted 
buildings increase over time, redeveloping a property sooner rather than later 
generally leads to greater cost-savings in the long run. 
Is there potential for high net benefits and public sector 
savings?
For blight, revenue generating potential depends largely on the number of 
lots in the target geography, and more specifically, on the estimate of property 
tax revenues, maintenance cost savings, or other revenue streams that could 
be generated following the provision of the SIB-funded service. Programs 
that involve many lots or one large project that presents the potential for a 
high return through revenue generation could be excellent candidates for SIB 
financing. 
The case study on the aforementioned Bristol Together (Case Study 2), 
provides an example of a blight remediation program—albeit one delivered 
via an anti-recidivism workforce training program—that generated enough 
revenue to fund a second service delivery cycle and provide financiers with a 
4-6% return on their investment. This suggests that blight remediation can in 
fact provide a significant enough return to be an attractive investment for SIB-
financiers. 
44 Roman, J. (2014, March 7). Senior Associate, Urban Institute - Justice Policy Center. 
(K. Tear, Interviewer)
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Are there measurable outcomes?
A primary programmatic criterion for SIB compatibility is identifying a 
performance metric that is both reliably measurable, and highly indicative 
of both programmatic success and financial returns.45 Some experts have 
expressed concern over SIB compatibility with blight reduction specifically 
because the outcomes can be difficult to measure.46 While the cost-savings 
presented by maintenance cost reduction or increases in property tax 
revenues are intrinsically tied to the success of the program, they can be 
challenging to measure systematically. For instance, property tax revenues 
enter a municipality’s general fund, but maintenance cost savings may accrue 
to a different government entity. One expert has suggested that in the case of 
blight remediation, a simpler metric may be desirable.47 Simple metrics, from 
an investor’s perspective, could include the number of lots that the city sells, 
or the square acreage of ground upon which cost-reducing native species are 
planted. So long as the government entity can guarantee the investor a return 
on their funding if the agreed upon standards are met, these simple metrics 
could prove to be satisfactory to both government and investor. But blight is 
inherently difficult to develop, and alternative land management strategies are 
not particularly lucrative. Guaranteeing the investor a return, particularly given 
the additional transaction costs that the SIB model presents, is the challenging 
aspect of using SIB-financing for blight remediation. 
Is the sample size sufficient and treatment population defined 
enough to establish credible impact assessments?
Blight remediation strategies inherently conflict with this criterion for several 
reasons. Blight-remediation, like many place-based strategies, often works 
best when public policies are targeted towards groups that are either 
geographically, physically, or otherwise similar, establishing a control group 
that also exhibits these characteristics but is not a part of the program is 
highly challenging. 
For instance, in March 2014, the city of Richmond in California passed a 
resolution directing city staff to work towards the implementation of a SIB-
45 Ibid; Galloway, I. (2013). Funding holistic community development with pay for   
success. Washington, DC: Nonprofit Finance Fund.
46 Chaskel, S. Harvard Kennedy School – Social Impact Bond Financing Lab. February  
26th, 2014. Phone interview. Interviewed by Karl Tear.
47 Roman, J. (2014, March 7). Senior Associate, Urban Institute - Justice Policy Center.  
(K. Tear, Interviewer)
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funded Distressed Housing Rehabilitation Program.48 The resolution states 
that the “initial target properties would likely be the ‘worst of the worst,’ in 
terms of condition.”49 From a public policy perspective, it makes sense to 
focus on (or perhaps triage) particularly problematic groups. But for Richmond 
to do so undermines the pseudo-experimental structure that some SIB 
experts believe a SIB-funded program must have. Obtaining a large enough 
sample size to meet this requirement is also a challenge. 
Again, this criterion assumes that investors will want, more or less, to see 
statistical significance, but the extent to which this criterion is even applicable 
to blight remediation is unclear. Bristol Together (Case Study 2), and its follow 
up program, Midlands Together, prove that investors may be amenable to less 
scientifically rigorous forms of evaluation, so long as the potential risks and 
returns of the investment are clear.
Do the program’s benefits accrue over a reasonable time-
frame? 
There are many blight-remediation programs that produce cost savings or 
revenue generation within five to ten years. The reduction of maintenance 
costs for city-owned properties can produce immediate savings, for instance, 
as can returning city-owned lots to the private property market and property 
tax roll. Of course, in the long-term, savings and revenue may be even more 
significant, as blight reduction creates a domino effect, slowly facilitating the 
long-term appreciation of a property values.
Are there safeguards for the target population?
Reducing blight benefits the municipality and its general population, but failing 
to do so does not cause explicit harm to the public. Blight reduction is an 
elective not an essential public service and individual residents do not stand 
to lose if the program does not succeed. Table 2 summarizes the discussion 
regarding the applicability of SIB-financing to blight-remediation programs. 
48  Richmond City Council. (2014). Resolution 20G-4. City of Richmond.
49  Ibid. p. 4
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Project Selection Criteria Potential for Blight Remediation to Meet Criterion
Preventative Service Yes
Potential for high net benefits and public 
sector savings Yes
Measurable outcomes Possible
Credible impact assessments (a “but-for” 
test) Possible, but challenging
     Sufficient sample sizes Unlikely
     Well-defined treatment population Possible, but challenging
Reasonable timeframe Possible
Safeguards for population N/A
Source: UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analysis
Our research indicates that the primary challenge associated with applying 
SIBs to blight remediation strategies is not their incompatibility with 
experimental set-ups or the presence of confounding variables. Rather, it 
is simply identifying blight remediation strategies that will reliably produce 
enough revenue to cover their costs in a reasonable amount of time. Bristol 
Together and Midlands Together have been able to successfully fund their 
intervention services--both people based and place-based through renovated-
property sales alone, because the sale price outweighed the renovation costs. 
In weaker real estate markets, additional subsidy--such as donated materials 
or discounted labor, as indicated in the City of Richmond’s RFP--may be 
required for the model to function. 
What constitutes an effective strategy will depend largely on the local market, 
municipal capacity, and the nature of the municipality’s blight problem. 
Municipalities that are comfortable taking on the role of the developer, for 
instance, are at an advantage because programmatic costs need not include 
a developer’s marginal profits. Likewise, municipalities in which blight 
manifests itself predominantly in large blocks of vacant land or brownfield 
sites will have another advantage in that such sites lend themselves to 
large-scale redevelopment. Despite the high upfront costs and significant 
uncertainty associated with blight remediation programs, using SIBs to 
finance these strategies is possible--it simply requires an efficient, more 
streamlined version of the SIB model. The next section of this report returns 
to the discussion of New Orleans’s blight problem, and the creative financing 
strategies through which this problem can be addressed. 
Table 2: Summary of Blight Remediation’s 
Ability to Meet SIB Selection Criteria
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Case Study Two: 
Restoring People & Properties 
Through SIBs. Bristol Together, 
United Kingdom
Source: Bristol Together
With Triodos Bank, Bristol Together was able to obtain £1.6 million from private investors in-
cluding the Ese’em Fairbairn Foundation and Barrow Cadbury Trust. Bristol Together and Trio-
dos Bank act as the intermediary; Aspire Bristol and Restore Trust are the service providers.
Partnership Roles
Initiator: Bristol Together
Service Providers: Aspire Bristol, Restore Trust 
Intermediary: Bristol Together, Triodos Bank
Investors: Ese’em Fairbairn Foundation, Barrow Cadbury Trust, and private investors 
Strategy
Bristol Together purchases vacant properties and employs ex-offenders to repair and refurbish 
them. Once complete, the properties are sold and surplus revenue is reinvested into the orga-
nization and used to pay off investors. The program allows investors to choose between two 
investment options:  Series A bonds, with a 4% fixed annual interest rate; and Series B bonds, 
with a 6% fixed annual interest rate. Investors who select the higher risk Series B option qualify 
for tax relief through the Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) program. The CITR program 
seeks to stimulate the flow of private capital to support enterprise in the UK’s deprived commu-
nities.
Current Status
The SIB is in its third full year of the loan period. Out of the initial 200 program participants that 
were recruited in October 2011, 80% are have maintained employment with Bristol Together or 
another company. The recidivism rate is less than 5%.
Relevance to New Orleans Redevelopment Authority
This case is relevant to NORA because it demonstrates that the SIB model can be utilized in 
the redevelopment of blighted and vacant property.  
Bristol Together, a U.K. based social enterprise, 
launched an innovative workforce development initiative 
that seeks to provide employment to ex-offenders and 
reduce recidivism while battling blight. Bristol Together 
purchases vacant properties and, with their partners, 
provides construction job training and employment to 
program participants. 

ANALYSIS
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In total, NORA has 2,593 properties in its inventory.  Of these, NORA acquired 
2,283 through the LLT.  NORA acquired the remaining 310 properties through 
expropriation or adjudication.  The study team only included the 310 non-LLT 
properties in this analysis.  We focused on these properties because they 
likely had serious title defects; as such, the cost of returning these properties 
to commerce is higher than the cost of returning many LLT properties to the 
private market.  Moreover, many of these lots are in neighborhoods of historic 
disinvestment and NORA may need to land bank them for many years due to 
a lack of market demand.  These conditions make the disposition of NORA’s 
310 non-LLT lots difficult to finance; these lots are therefore good candidates 
for disposition or alternative land management through creative financing 
mechanisms.  Furthermore, because NORA did not acquire these properties 
through a federally-funded program like the Road Home, the income NORA 
could receive from their sale would not have use restrictions.  Therefore, 
the non-LLT properties are most appropriate for SIB or alternative financing 
strategies.  If these strategies are successful, they can be applied to NORA’s 
larger inventory.
NORA provided the team with an inventory of its properties.  This included 
non-LLT properties and LLT properties.  Using information provided by NORA 
and the Orleans Parish Assessor’s Office, we determined which non-LLT 
properties NORA acquired through expropriation—received from the city 
through eminent domain—and which properties the agency acquired through 
adjudication—received from the city through tax foreclosure.  Appendix D 
delineates which properties were expropriated as opposed to adjudicated as 
determined by the study team.
The majority of NORA’s parcels are LLT properties and do not have title 
issues.  NORA’s 310 non-LLT properties, however, likely have serious title 
defects.  Of these 310 properties, the obstacles NORA faces in returning 
the 295 expropriated properties to the private market are distinct from 
the challenges it faces in returning the 15 adjudicated properties to the 
private market.  Specifically, although a title attorney can clear the title to 
an expropriated property through a relatively straightforward, albeit costly, 
process, NORA can only sell its adjudicated properties through a tax sale.  
Even then, the buyer will not have a clear title to the adjudicated lot, making 
these properties poor candidates for disposition.
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Clearing expropriated property titles in New Orleans is a straightforward 
and well-defined process.  A due process violation should not arise if after 
reviewing the title abstract, the representation of all absentees by a curator 
was ensured.  If a curator did not represent all absentees, corrective action 
will need to be taken. The title clearance of NORA’s adjudicated properties 
is a more difficult process necessitating individual, case-by-case evaluation. 
It would be safe for NORA to assume that all of its 15 adjudicated properties 
have due process issues, and that one, in perpetuity, may make a claim to the 
title. Therefore, to discharge these properties, NORA must determine what 
its minimum threshold is for selling these properties (e.g. a percentage of 
current appraised value).  A potential avenue for discharging its adjudicated 
properties, NORA may cluster adjudicated properties with cleared title 
properties for sale and development.  This may cause the adjudicated 
property to be viewed as less of a risk to the developer.
Based on our research, we developed four strategies for NORA’s non-LLT 
properties: title clearance for sale at auction, clustered redevelopment, 
stormwater management, and lot leasing.  The objective of our Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) analysis was to identify which properties were the 
most appropriate candidates for each strategy.  We gathered data on Orleans 
Parish’s real estate market and physical conditions and developed criteria for 
each strategy.  Utilizing GIS software, we identified the ideal properties for 
each strategy.
To understand the potential demand for properties in each neighborhood, we 
used the New Orleans Market Value Analysis (MVA). NORA commissioned 
the community development finance organization, The Reinvestment Fund, 
to complete the MVA in March 2013. The MVA is a “tool designed to assist 
the private market and government officials to identify and…precisely craft 
intervention strategies in weak markets and support sustainable growth in 
stronger market segments.”50 
The MVA looked at several different factors such as median residential sales 
price, the foreclosure rate, the number of vacant units and other factors to 
identify census blocks with strong market potential.  With this information, the 
MVA classified each census block with an alphabetical ranking of A through 
H to determine the strength of that census block’s real estate market. For 
50 The City of New Orleans. 2013. New Orleans market value analysis – final report   
3.25.2013. Accessed April 20th, 2014. Available: https://data.nola.gov/Geographic-  
Reference/New-Orleans-Market-Value-Analysis-Final-Report-3-2/kex2-vq3e
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the purpose of this analysis, we grouped these classifications into three 
categories of strong, transitional, and weak markets. Census blocks with an 
MVA classification of A, B, or C were considered “strong markets,” census 
blocks with an MVA classification of D or E were considered “transitional 
markets,” and census blocks with an MVA classification of F, G, or H were 
considered “weak markets.”  We also looked at the current zoning, future 
land use, and proposed zoning for Orleans Parish to determine what uses 
were allowed on NORA-owned properties.  We found that almost all non-LLT 
properties were zoned residential.
We also considered the properties’ physical conditions, including whether 
the property contained a structure or whether it was vacant, and its flood 
risk.  Unfortunately, the current Flood Insurance Rate Maps for Orleans 
Parish are unavailable due to ongoing legal contestation.  We therefore used 
the advisory base flood elevation data developed by FEMA after Hurricane 
Katrina. With help from the University of New Orleans’ Center for Hazards, 
Assessment, Response and Technology (CHART) we classified which areas 
had higher, moderate, and lower flood risk. 
Using this data, we developed criteria for each strategy.  The following 
sections detail the criteria needed to qualify for each strategy. 
Strategy I: Title Clearance for Sale at Auction 
The purpose of this strategy is to clear titles to properties in relatively strong 
markets, so that NORA can sell these properties at auction.  Properties 
included in this category are located in census blocks with stronger resale 
potential as defined by the MVA.  These census blocks include MVA 
classifications of A, B, and C.  In addition to the MVA criteria, we only included 
expropriated properties in this analysis. Since the goal of this strategy is to sell 
properties at auction, we excluded adjudicated properties due to the lengthy 
legal process required to clear the title to such properties.
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Strategy II: Clustered Redevelopment 
The purpose of this strategy is to create catalytic redevelopment projects 
in transitional markets by incentivizing the sale and redevelopment of 
clusters of properties in transitional neighborhoods. The rationale here is 
that the redevelopment of multiple, geographically proximate, properties 
could spur neighborhood revitalization; furthermore, by clustering properties 
together and actively engaging with a developer, NORA could incentivize 
the sale and redevelopment of properties in transitional neighborhoods 
in which developers might otherwise be reluctant to work. In identifying 
clusters appropriate for this strategy, we excluded the properties identified 
as appropriate for Strategy I: Title Clearance for Auction. We did, however, 
include adjudicated properties.  Although these properties are highly 
challenging to sell, NORA could potentially transfer an adjudicated lot to the 
developer or entity purchasing a bundle of nearby expropriated properties 
through a tax sale.51 In order to increase the number of clusters for potential 
redevelopment, we gave priority to expropriated and adjudicated properties 
adjacent to one another and expropriated and adjudicated properties within 
200 meters of a property received from the LLT.
Strategy III: Stormwater Management 
Properties included in this strategy are not included in the strategies related 
to title clearance and clustered redevelopment.  Stormwater management 
activities on vacant lots contribute to flood control efforts, so we only included 
properties with high flood risk in this strategy. We excluded adjudicated 
properties from this strategy.  Given the significant capital expenditures 
required for the installation of stormwater management infrastructure, we 
decided it would be best to eliminate the risk of ownership claims completely, 
by limiting this strategy to expropriated properties. In order to reduce the costs 
associated with the installation of stormwater management infrastructure, we 
only included vacant properties in this strategy.  Additionally, since properties 
51 Although there is no guarantee that a developer would necessarily want to purchase 
an adjudicated property, NORA can present developers with several reasons why they 
should consider purchasing one as part of a larger bundle of properties. The devel-
oper would have site control over the adjudicated property, and could use it as green 
space during the 10-year period that it takes to acquire a clear title to such a property. 
Moreover, over the course of the 10-years the property would likely appreciate in value 
due to the developer’s and NORA’s work.  
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in stronger market areas are more suited to sale at auction, only properties 
located in MVA classifications of F, G, or H are included in the stormwater 
management strategy.
Strategy IV: Lot Leasing 
The primary goal of this strategy is to reduce NORA’s long-term expenses 
related to maintenance and insurance of properties.  By leasing vacant lots to 
community groups or individuals, NORA can shift maintenance and insurance 
costs to these entities.  We excluded properties identified for title clearance, 
clustered redevelopment, or stormwater management from this strategy.  As 
in the stormwater management criteria, properties appropriate for lot leasing 
are located in census blocks with MVA classifications of F, G, or H.  We only 
included vacant properties in this strategy, since a blighted structure limits 
a property’s potential uses and increases NORA’s liability risk.  Also, since 
community groups and individuals will use these lots, the study team excluded 
properties with high flood risk from the lot leasing strategy.
TITLE CLEARANCE 
STRATEGIES
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NORA’s primary barrier to selling non-LLT lots is the upfront cost associated 
with obtaining marketable titles.  These costs can be difficult to justify 
given the limited market demand for most blighted or vacant lots.  Our 
research indicates that title attorneys and agencies are willing to provide 
their services at a discounted rate in order to obtain a contract for work on 
multiple properties.52 Moreover, NORA simply cannot sell any of its properties 
without obtaining clear title.  As such, title clearance is a prerequisite to any 
disposition strategy.  The two disposition strategies outlined in this section-
-title clearance for sale at auction and clustered redevelopment—both rely 
on NORA procuring a title agency to provide title clearance services at a 
discounted rate, in bulk. 
Title agencies and attorneys vary in the extent to which they are willing to 
discount their services for a large contract.53  For the purposes of this report, 
however, we assume that per lot title clearance costs will average $17,000 
if NORA engages an attorney or agency to work on a bundle of at least 30 
lots.  Our discussions with local attorneys indicate that a title agency would be 
willing to accept a flat fee of approximately $2,000 per lot for such a project, 
so long as NORA pays all court costs.54 Court costs are highly variable, but we 
estimate NORA should expect per lot costs to average $15,000.55
The first strategy--Title Clearance for Sale at Auction--involves NORA 
engaging a title agency in a performance-based contract much like the 
contracts NORA already issues to local title agencies for its LLT properties.  
Under this strategy, however, the title agency will work to clear the titles to 
NORA’s non-LLT properties in strong markets. The idea here is that NORA 
could then auction these properties via its existing auction strategy and use 
the resulting income to repay the title agencies. 
 
52 Arizona Department of Financial Institutions. 2014. Equity Title Agency Inc. General  
Rules - 3/18/2014. Accessed April 20th, 2014. Available: http://www.azdfi.gov/  
Consumers/PublicRecords/Forms/Rate%20Filings/Equity_TItle_Agency_031814_  
RF.pdf, p. 6; Howensite, L. (2014, March 31). Title Attorney, Elkins PLC. (R. Bauer, E.  
Oliver, & A. Monet, Interviewers)
53 Howensite, L. (2014, March 31). Title Attorney, Elkins PLC. (R. Bauer, E. Oliver, & A.  
Monet, Interviewers)
54 Ibid.
55 The most significant court cost for these properties is the $31 cancellation fee per  
inscription. This cost is also the most variable, with inscriptions per expropriated prop-
erty potentially ranging from a dozen to several hundred. Fifteen thousand dollars, our 
court cost estimate, would cover the removal of approximately 480 inscriptions. While 
this figure is on the high end of the potential cost range, we feel it would behoove 
NORA to stick with this or a similarly conservative estimate, given the variability of this 
cost).
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The second strategy--Clustered Redevelopment—involves the use of SIB-
financing for catalytic redevelopment projects that incorporate clusters of 
non-LLT lots in transitional markets.  Together, these two strategies contribute 
to NORA’s mission of blight reduction while also freeing up agency funds 
formerly allocated to maintaining these non-LLT lots.
Strategy I: Title Clearance for Sale at Auction 
Strategy I: Title Clearance for Sale at Auction, is appropriate for expropriated 
properties in relatively strong markets, as defined by the MVA analysis. Given 
the demand for residential lots in these markets, NORA could potentially sell 
these lots at auction once the authority has obtained a clear and marketable 
title to the lots. Since these properties will be sold individually, they do not 
need to be in clusters as do the lots identified for Strategy II. The sale of 
these properties will result in immediate, income for NORA; we therefore 
recommend that NORA implement this strategy first. The resulting revenue 
could then be used to fund or supplement the authority’s other activities. 
Identification of Auctionable Properties 
Our GIS analysis indicated that there are 43 properties appropriate for this 
strategy. These 43 properties, identified in Figure 2 (and listed in Appendix D), 
meet the criteria established in the analysis section: the lots are expropriated, 
rather than adjudicated, and they are located in neighborhoods with MVA 
rankings of A, B, or C. A map of NORA’s expropriated properties that are 
located in strong markets is shown in Map 1.
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Funding Mechanism 
It is unlikely that socially-minded investors will be interested in financing 
title clearance for the market rate sale of properties to private individuals or 
developers since investors usually prefer tangible projects and the social 
benefit is unclear.  As such, the SIB model is not an appropriate financing 
mechanism for Strategy I. Instead, we recommend that NORA fund this 
strategy through a straightforward, performance-based contract with a local 
title agency.  A performance-based contract allows the contract initiator to only 
pay for work that has been completed.  Thus, NORA will only pay the attorney 
completing the title work on the authority’s behalf once they have completed 
their work, and possibly, after the property is sold.  The potential challenge 
with this strategy is that attorneys or title agencies may be reluctant to agree 
to delayed payment (payment upon the sale of the property). However, most 
firms familiar with government contracts anticipate payment delays due to the 
additional regulations and bureaucracy associated with them.  
The team recommends NORA issue a Request-for-Proposal (RFP) detailing 
the nuances of the payment plan and choose an attorney or firm to engage 
in title clearance for the properties.  Based on our cost estimates, it will 
cost approximately $700,000 if the contracted attorneys clear the title to all 
43 properties ($17,000 per lot x 43 lots = $731,000).  Upon clearance of a 
property’s title, NORA should be able to sell the property at auction. NORA 
tends to auction properties at prices well above $17,000 per lot, on average.  
Once NORA receives payment for the property, the agency can pay the 
attorneys for their work as dictated in the pay-for-performance contract, 
while likely making a profit on the sale of most properties.  In addition to this 
immediate return on investment from the sale of properties, NORA will no 
longer have annual maintenance and insurance costs for any properties sold.
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Strategy II: Clustered Redvelopment
Although SIB-financing is not appropriate for title clearance alone, our 
research and analysis indicates that NORA could potentially use SIB funding 
to finance catalytic redevelopment projects in transitional markets. This 
strategy, clustered redevelopment, is best suited for clusters of expropriated 
properties in transitional markets--markets where there is not enough 
demand for NORA to reasonably expect to auction off the properties on a 
piecemeal basis, even if they had clear titles--but where a strategically-placed 
redevelopment could spur neighborhood revitalization.  Again, we define 
transitional markets as those ranked in the MVA analysis as D or E.
From NORA’s perspective, the benefits of this strategy are two-fold.  First, 
it would finance title clearance services and potentially subsidize the 
disposition of these difficult-to-sell properties, relieving NORA of its land-
banking responsibility for these lots.  Second, the program itself--the strategic 
redevelopment of properties in transitional markets--supports NORA’s 
mission.  As such, the program also has the potential to attract investment 
from socially minded lenders and foundations in a way that the first strategy-
-clearing titles for auction--does not.  Given the challenges associated with 
large-scale redevelopment projects in transitional markets, this approach will 
likely require NORA to partner with or otherwise formally engage with a real 
estate development entity to incentivize the purchase and redevelopment of 
these lots.
Identification of Clusters for Redevelopment
In order to identify clusters of properties for which this strategy would be 
appropriate, we conducted a spatial analysis that identified clusters--groups 
of 4 or more non-LLT lots within a 200 meter radius of one another, including 
at least two adjacent lots and excluding those that had already been identified 
and selected for the sale at auction strategy--within the MVA’s D or E markets. 
We initially sought to identify clusters of properties within commercial districts, 
as NORA has engaged in commercial or mixed use redevelopment projects 
in its efforts to catalyze neighborhood revitalization in the past.  There were, 
however, no bundles of properties that met our criteria and were also in a 
commercial zoning district. 
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It is, therefore, our recommendation that NORA draw on its recent experience 
as the grant administrator for a $29.7 million Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program 2 grant, and, much as it did during the NSP2 process, promote 
neighborhood level revitalization through the subsidization of turn-key, 
scattered-site residential development in strategically located neighborhoods.
Although several clusters met our minimum criteria, we decided on four 
clusters of properties in Broadmoor/Central City, Algiers (Whitney), 7th Ward/
St. Roch, and Florida/St. Claude.  Map 2 (see map on next page) identifies 
these neighborhoods.  The clusters of expropriated/adjudicated lots depicted 
in Map 2 represent prime targets for catalytic development projects because, 
in addition to meeting the previously discussed criteria, they also contain 
a significant number of (at minimum, 15) LLT-lots within their geographic 
boundaries.  It is beyond the scope of this report to make concrete 
recommendations regarding NORA’s LLT properties, but it is worth noting that 
having an abundance of LLT lots within the boundaries of the redevelopment 
clusters will provide NORA with additional flexibility and leeway when deciding 
on the details of its disposition strategy.  Additionally, the majority of the lots 
in these clusters fall into the City of New Orleans’ Place-Based Revitalization 
Strategy’s target neighborhoods, as defined by the Office of Community 
Development (OCD).  OCD defined the boundaries of these place-based 
target neighborhoods in order “to prioritize the availability of formerly blighted 
properties into the city’s Soft Second Program.”56  By promoting catalytic 
redevelopment projects in these neighborhoods, NORA can insure that its 
activities complement and enhance the city’s place-based, blight reduction 
strategies.
It is also worth noting here that one of the lots in the St. Roch cluster is an 
adjudicated property, which would need to be sold at a tax sale--ideally to 
NORA’s development partner--rather than incorporated in the title clearance 
bundle.  Although NORA cannot transfer a clear title for an adjudicated 
property to the developer, it will be in the developer’s best interest, if the 
developer wants to include an adjudicated property in the development, 
to maintain the lot and acquire clear title through good faith acquisitive 
prescription when possible.
56 City of New Orleans. 2014. Blight Reduction Report - January 2014. Accessed, April 
20th, 2014. Available: http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/Performance-and-Account-
ability/Initiatives-and-Reports/BlightSTAT/Blight-Report_web.pdf/, p. 19.
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Funding Mechanism
NORA could potentially finance the clustered development strategy through a 
modified SIB model.  However, for this strategy to work using SIB financing, 
NORA would need to take on the responsibilities of the intermediary.  Our 
initial analysis suggests that the revenues from the sale of these properties, in 
addition to the cost savings generated through maintenance cost reductions, 
could potentially provide enough funding to pay for the title services 
necessary to get these lots to a marketable condition.  The structure of such a 
model is depicted in Figure 2.
This model does not include the evaluator typically seen in a SIB model.  
As discussed in Section III (SIBs and Blight), the profit margins for blight 
remediation projects tend to be too slim to reliably cover all of the transaction 
costs typically associated with a full SIB model.  Table 3, which summarizes 
a preliminary financial feasibility analysis of this project, reveals tight profit 
margins that rely on maintenance cost savings.  Rather than attempting to 
pay an outside evaluator, the foundational investor, could, in concert with 
NORA staff, conduct performance monitoring and evaluation in-house.  
Although this does not meet the rigorous evaluation standards promoted by 
some SIB experts, NORA demonstrated its institutional capacity to deliver 
timely and accurate compliance reporting as the grant administrator in the 
recent NSP2 program.  NORA could leverage this experience to negotiate a 
cost-effective, in-house performance evaluation process with its institutional 
investor. 
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Figure 2: Clustered Redevelopment SIB Financing Model
Again, whether such a project is feasible at all depends on NORA’s ability to 
find a willing investor and a willing developer.  NORA will need to structure this 
deal so as to provide the developer with the financial returns he or she needs 
for project feasibility, while also insuring that the project meets the social 
outcomes we have to assume a socially-minded investor or foundation will 
want to see.
As for the developer’s needs, given the high costs of scattered site residential 
development and the limited residential demand in these markets, it is safe 
to assume that NORA’s development partner will require an incentive to 
purchase this relatively large bundle of properties.  The discount should 
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be substantial enough to cover the gap between the cost to build and 
the price at which residential developments could feasibly be sold in 
these neighborhoods.  Although NORA will need to determine the actual 
discount rate, for the purposes of our preliminary financial modeling, we 
assumed that NORA would sell the properties for 50% of their appraised 
value (a description of how we estimated average property values for each 
neighborhood is in Appendix C).  Similar to a wholesale-over-retail discount, 
this 50% cost reduction serves as a subsidy that should help make the deal 
feasible from the developer’s perspective.
In order to attract socially minded investors, NORA should consider placing 
some restrictions on to whom the developer can sell the properties.  Requiring 
the buyer to be a low or moderate income, first time homeowner, per the 
NSP2 regulations, is appealing because it expands access to homeownership 
opportunities in New Orleans.  Such a requirement would, however, also 
limit the pool of potential buyers.  Since many low-income families have 
trouble qualifying for a first mortgage and meeting the continued cost of 
homeownership, this requirement would constrain the pool of demand.  Also, 
it would duplicate the efforts of the city’s soft second program and NORA’s 
NSP2 program, which subsidized homeownership for households earning 
below 80% AMI and 120% AMI, respectively. 57
NORA’s primary goal is to remove these lots from its inventory and 
to stimulate neighborhood revitalization--not to necessarily expand 
homeownership opportunities to low income households.  As such, a more 
appropriate requirement might be that the buyer fall within the 120% - 160% 
AMI range.  This income bracket has difficulty purchasing quality, market rate 
homes in New Orleans, but was not served by the city’s soft second program 
or the NSP2 program. NORA could attain community support and the interest 
of investors by marketing this strategy as a workforce housing development 
project. Also, serving the 120%-160% AMI bracket in these place-based 
neighborhoods will insure that this project does not duplicate the efforts of the 
NSP2 program or the city’s Soft Second Program.  
57 City of New Orleans. 2014. Blight Reduction Report - January 2014. Accessed, April 
20th, 2014. Available: http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/Performance-and-Account-
ability/Initiatives-and-Reports/BlightSTAT/Blight-Report_web.pdf/, p. 19; New Orleans 
Redevelopment Authority. 2013. Neighborhood Stabilization Program Phase 2 Report. 
Accessed April 25th, 2014. Available: http://www.noraworks.org/public/files/general-
uploads/NORA_NSP2-July_2013_Report.pdf
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Table 3 summarizes a preliminary financial feasibility analysis of this project.
With a total of 48 lots, title clearance services for this bundle of properties will 
require an upfront investment of $816,000.  Again, the actual discount applied 
to the property’s sale price is flexible. But, if we assume NORA sells these 
properties for approximately 50% of their appraised value, their sale could 
result in total revenue generation of $647,493.  Including the cost savings 
generated by NORA’s reduced maintenance costs over a 10-year period, the 
disposition of these lots would generate approximately $855,000 in revenue.  
That cost savings provides an investor with a 4.89% return.
This model should serve as a starting point for NORA as the agency moves 
forward in developing a concrete disposition strategy and identifying investor 
and development partners.  One of the local, non-profit developers that NORA 
has worked with in the past would be an excellent development partner.  
NORA could approach Goldman Sachs—which, as indicated in Case Study 
1, is already active in the field of SIB-financing—as a potential investor.  The 
Ford Foundation is another potential investor; the Ford Foundation remains 
active in real estate-based grant funding in the New Orleans area.58
58 Crescent City Community Land Trust. 2014. Our Partners. Accessed April 27th, 2014. 
Available: http://www.ccclt.org/?page_id=114
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Broadmoor/ 
Central City Whitney
7th Ward/
St. Roch
Florida/St. 
Claude Total
Title Clearance Costs
Lots 31 7 6* 4 48
Title clearance costs/
lot ($17,000) ($17,000) ($17,000) ($17,000) ($17,000)
  Flat fee ($2,000) ($2,000) ($2,000) ($2,000) ($2,000)
  Average court costs ($15,000) ($15,000) ($15,000) ($15,000) ($15,000)
Total title clearance 
costs for bundle 
(Investment)
($527,000) ($119,000) ($102,000) ($68,000)
 Revenue from Sales
Market rate sale price 
per lot $21,333 $43,216 $32,587 $33,907  
Discount 50% 50% 50% 50%  
Revenue from sale of 
bundle $330,662 $151,256 $97,761 $67,814 $647,493 
 Savings from Redevelopment
Annual property 
maintenance cost 
savings ($500/lot)
$15,500 $3,500 $3,000 $2,000 $24,000 
Present value of 
10 years’ worth of 
savings**
$134,578 $30,389 $26,047 $17,365 $208,378 
 Total Revenue and Costs Savings
TOTAL REVENUE / 
COST SAVINGS $465,239 $181,645 $123,808 $85,179 $855,871 
RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT -11.72% 52.64% 21.38% 25.26% 4.89%
Source: UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analysis
*Note that there are actually 7 lots in this bundle but, as discussed previously, one of these is 
an adjudicated lot that would need to be sold to the developer at a tax sale. Given the uncer-
tainty regarding whether or not NORA’s development partners will decide to purchase this lot, 
revenues associated with its sale--which would be limited-- are not included in the model.
** In estimating the cost savings associated with reduced maintenance costs, we assumed 
that the sale of one lot would result in annual savings of $500 for a total of $27,500 per year.  
We then calculated the present value of ten years’ worth of savings, using the current trea-
sury bond interest rate (2.77%, compounded semi-annually), as a discount rate. 
Table 3: Potential Revenue from Redevelopment Clusters

ALTERNATIVE LAND 
MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGIES 
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NORA spends roughly $500 per lot annually to manage, maintain and 
insure property in its possession.  Due to the continued maintenance costs 
NORA faces, and the lack of immediate options for the properties being 
analyzed in this section, the team recommends that NORA work to expand its 
alternative land management strategies.  By changing the use or maintenance 
requirements of property, NORA can not only save money, but also create 
viable environmental solutions that benefit the neighborhoods in which these 
projects are located.
The strategies discussed in this section are appropriate for properties that are 
not suitable for auction or packaging for a residential or commercial project 
given the difficulty of identifying a viable title clearance strategy.  Though there 
are two strategies, the team is recommending the expansion of stormwater 
management and community partnerships.The stormwater management 
strategy involves the use of an SIB partnership with Sewerage and Water 
Board (S&WB), where NORA land reduces stress on the pumping system 
and has a positive environmental impact by converting vacant properties into 
stormwater depositories.The lot leasing strategy involves the use of a pay for 
success model in which an intermediary is incentivized to expand the Growing 
Green program.  This strategy reduces NORA’s cost on lot maintenance and 
insurance while also creating a stream of revenue. 
Strategy III: Stormwater Management 
NORA has taken the initiative to improve the City of New Orleans’ stormwater 
management by implementing green infrastructure projects on their vacant 
properties and including best management practices into their construction 
procedures.  The Pontilly Stormwater Management Hazard Mitigation 
project is a prime example of how NORA was able to reduce runoff and 
flooding in the Pontilly neighborhood through collaborative efforts with 
architecture and engineering firms.  NORA’s stormwater management 
strategy is complementary to the goals of the S&WB.  S&WB is currently 
under a consent decree issued by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
which mandates that it improve its pumping stations to be able to operate 
simultaneously at peak flow periods in order to prevent inland flooding and 
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pre-treated wastewater discharge into the East Bank Collection System.59  
Currently the S&WB has paid $1,500,000 plus interest in fines for non-
compliance.60  In addition to penalty fees, the EPA mandated the S&WB to 
spend a minimum of $2,000,000 to improve the water quality through the 
Supplemental Environmental Project.61  A partnership between NORA and 
the S&WB could assist the S&WB with meeting the objectives indicated in 
the consent decree, avoiding costly penalties, while also alleviating NORA of 
the burden of maintaining some of the vacant properties in its portfolio.  The 
creation of stormwater infrastructure on vacant properties in areas with a high 
risk of flooding will assist in supporting the mission of the S&WB by improving 
the water quality, a major goal of the consent decree, while serving NORA’s 
revitalization objectives.
Identification of Stormwater Management Properties
Desire/St. Roch and the Lower Ninth Ward contained the most properties 
that are highly suitable for stormwater management (Map 3).  The study 
team identified 13 properties for stormwater management development 
in the Desire/ St. Roch community.62  In the Lower Ninth Ward, the study 
team identified 30 lots.  According to the City of New Orleans Neighborhood 
Rebuilding Plan (CNONRP) for the St. Roch Community, created after 2005, 
properties located between St. Claude and N. Miro St. “received between 
1 and 4 feet of flood water” due to Hurricane Katrina.63  In the Lower Ninth 
Ward, homes built in the 1950s received over 8 feet of water due to storm 
surge from Hurricane Katrina as reported in the Lower Ninth Ward Planning 
59 U.S. District Court-Eastern District of Louisiana New Orleans Division, 2013. United 
States of America (plaintiff), League of Women Voters of New Orleans, et al. (plaintiff) 
v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, and the City of New Orleans (defen-
dants), State of Louisiana (defendant), Civil Action NO. 93-3212 Section “S” Mag. 
1, Second Modified Consent Decree. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. 
Retrieved on March 17, 2014. Available: http://www.swbno.org/docs_consentdecree.
asp
60       Ibid.
61       Ibid.
62 Brown, Deron, Bermello-Ajamil & Partners, Inc, Hewitt, Lonnie, Hewitt-Washington, 
Inc., Sanchez, Alfredo St. Martin - Brown & Associates, LLP, St. Martin, Joseph, No 
Date.St. Roch  Neighborhood Planning District 7 Rebuilding Plan. City of New Or-
leans. Retrieved on April 14, 2014. Available: http://nolanrp.com/data/neighborhood/
district_7_final_stroch.pdf
63       Ibid.
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District Rebuilding Plan.64  Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the drainage systems in 
the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Roch communities were in very poor condition 
and Hurricane Katrina only exacerbated them.65  Thus, the stormwater 
management project will assist the Desire/ St. Roch and Lower Ninth Ward 
communities in meeting the S&WB’s goal of improving their drainage systems. 
Funding Mechanism
Utilizing SIBs to fund the maintenance costs for NORA’s vacant properties will 
alleviate the financial strain placed on undedicated capital. A SIB partnership 
between NORA and the S&WB would provide the opportunity for NORA to 
reduce its maintenance responsibility for vacant properties, for the S&WB 
to meet its goals indicated in the consent decree, and improve the quality 
of life for the residents of New Orleans.  In a SIB structural model, NORA 
and the S&WB would enter into a contract where NORA would provide 
a designated amount of vacant properties (determined by NORA) for 
stormwater management projects (Figure 3).  Financing for the project would 
come from private investors and the S&WB.  GNO, Inc., and the Greater 
New Orleans Foundation might serve as potential investors for this particular 
project.  GNO, Inc. funded the Greater New Orleans Urban Water Plan and 
the Greater New Orleans Foundation has demonstrated an interest in working 
with environmental issues affecting the Greater New Orleans area.66  The 
study team identified Waggoner & Ball Architects and the LSU School of 
Architecture as prospective service providers who could create and implement 
stormwater management plans for the designated vacant lots.  In this model, 
the S&WB can serve as the project manager to ensure compliance with 
requirements of the consent decree and to ensure timely completion of the 
projects.  
Over a five to ten-year period, which is the average timeframe of an 
SIB model, the S&WB, private, institutional, or nonprofit organizations 
collaborating in this program would absorb the maintenance costs of these 
64 Bermello-Ajamil & Partners, Inc., Sanchez, Alfredo, Hewitt-Washington, Inc.,Hewitt, 
Lonnie, No Date. Lower Ninth Ward Planning District Rebuilding Plan. City of New 
Orleans. Retrieved on April 14, 2014. Available: http://www.nolaplans.com/plans/Lam-
bert%20Intermediate/District_8_Plan_FINAL%20PLAN%20REPORT%20Lower%20
Ninth%20Ward-10-03-06.pdf
65       Brown, et al.
66 GNO, Inc. 2011. Greater New Orleans, Inc. The Greater New Orleans Urban Water 
Plan. Retrieved on April 11, 2014. Available: http://gnoinc.org/initiatives/the-greater-
new-orleans-water-plan/
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lots.  NORA will save $500 per lot per year.  In addition, reduced flooding 
would improve neighborhood stabilization and potentially increase disposition 
of other NORA properties. The S&WB would define the outcomes such as 
improved water quality, improved drainage, and potentially decreased demand 
on pumping stations. 
For this option to be viable, NORA would need to facilitate the conversation 
and the process to create a SIB vehicle.  NORA would need to demonstrate 
to the S&WB the cost-benefit of pursuing green infrastructure in addition to 
their existing RFP, which funds $500,000 for green infrastructure projects per 
year for five years. The staff resources necessary for obtaining investor buy-in 
required for SIBs without guaranteed outcomes could discourage S&WB from 
entering into a SIB partnership with NORA.  Another challenge is ensuring 
that progress made meets S&WB requirements.  If service providers do not 
achieve requirements, then investors would not receive a return on their 
investment allocated by the S&WB.  Lastly, NORA must identify who would be 
responsible for the maintenance of the stormwater management lots once the 
SIB term has expired.
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Figure 3: Stormwater Management SIB Financing Model
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Strategy IV: Lot Leasing
NORA is currently making advancements in the field of alternative land 
management.  The Growing Green program has produced 11 community 
partnerships with groups who, in exchange for the use of NORA-owned 
land, pay a lease fee and become responsible for the upkeep of the lots 
used.  In the current model, an intermediary group connects community 
groups in need of land to NORA lots.  The community groups pay an annual 
rental fee to NORA of $250 plus property insurance on leased lots.  These 
community partnerships have the potential to generate revenue and provide 
substantial cost savings for NORA, while also contributing to community 
revitalization.  We are proposing NORA expand the Growing Green program 
through a pay-for-performance model, in which NORA pays an intermediary 
group a percentage of the revenues and cost savings from entering lots into 
community partnerships.  The study group analyzed the 310 properties to 
determine which would be most suitable for the expansion of the Growing 
Green program.  Upon completion of this analysis, the study steam modeled 
the potential use of pay-for-success contracts in expanding NORA’s Growing 
Green program.  The following two sections detail the properties identified as 
most appropriate for the Growing Green program and the financial mechanism 
to support the program. 
Identification of Lot Leasing Properties
Based on the mapping analysis, the study team identified 157 properties 
suitable for lot leasing through the Growing Green program clustered in 
the Lower Ninth Ward/ Holy Cross neighborhoods and the McDonough 
neighborhood (Map 4).  These neighborhoods contain many vacant and 
blighted, due to lack of upkeep after Hurricane Katrina.
Funding Mechanism
The expansion of the Growing Green program has the potential to create 
additional revenue and cost savings for NORA, while promoting NORA’s goals 
of community partnership and neighborhood revitalization.  NORA’s current 
model involves an intermediary that connects nonprofits, community groups, 
or individuals with approved projects to NORA properties.  In this model, the 
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intermediary is an unpaid mission-driven organization that benefits from its 
partnership with NORA through having the opportunity to connect groups and 
individuals with land at a low cost, serving its overall mission.  NORA benefits 
by passing on the maintenance and insurance costs of selected properties 
to community groups.  Further, the development of projects such as urban 
farms on these lots has the potential to bring added social and revitalization 
benefits to targeted neighborhoods.  Community groups benefit through the 
opportunity to lease NORA-owned land at a cost of $250 per year plus the 
cost of insurance.  At the end of the lease term, groups may also have the 
opportunity to purchase the lots.  Since its development, Growing Green has 
served to connect eleven community groups and individuals with NORA lots, 
bringing innovative community projects into New Orleans neighborhoods.  In 
the coming year, NORA hopes to work with the intermediary organization in 
expanding the program to more than 100 NORA-owned lots.  However, this 
model may be limited because the intermediary lacks financially incentive to 
increase partnerships on NORA lots and thus may not end up expanding the 
Growing Green program to its full potential.
The study team sees high potential for revenues and cost savings with the 
continued expansion of the Growing Green program.  In particular, we see 
the opportunity for NORA to expand the program to reach and go beyond 
the goal of 100 community partnerships through financially incentivizing the 
success of the intermediary.  The team proposes a performance-based model, 
in which NORA would pay the intermediary a percentage of cost savings and 
revenues for lots it enters into the care of community partners.  This model of 
the Growing Green program is similar to NORA’s existing model.  However, 
the Growing Green program incentivizes the intermediary group involved 
through payments to increase the number of lots in community partnerships.  
NORA pays the intermediary only for lots that it enters into successful 
community partnerships.  Continued payment of a portion of the revenues and 
cost savings from these lots further incentivizes the intermediary to maintain 
existing partnerships.  Success could be determined by the group’s fulfillment 
of the lease requirements or by other more specific measures specified 
by NORA.  Specifically, the group’s ongoing maintenance of the property 
and implementation of appropriate projects should be significant in the 
determination of successful partnerships and in payments to the intermediary.
We detail the financial mechanism and potential cost savings that NORA could 
incur through the incorporation of a performance-based model for Growing 
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Green in Table 4.  Through the mapping analysis, the study team identified 
157 of the expropriated and adjudicated properties that have high potential 
for use in the Growing Green program.  NORA currently receives no revenue 
from these lots, and NORA pays insurance and maintenance costs at a rate of 
$500 per year on each lot.  As displayed in Table 4, NORA will spend almost 
$900,000 on these lots over a ten-year period.  The study team modeled the 
use of a performance-based contract in which the 157 lots identified in the 
mapping analysis were placed in community partnerships through Growing 
Green over a 10-year period.  By year five we assume the intermediary will 
have placed all 157 lots in community partnerships.  Combined revenues 
and cost savings over a ten-year period total over $1 million.  According to 
the model, NORA would pay the intermediary 25 percent of cost savings and 
revenues during each year that each lot is being maintained by a community 
partner, a rate that could be altered according to NORA’s needs.  In this 
model, NORA achieves an adjusted savings of more than $800,000, with 
a return on investment of 2.0.  Further benefits that the model is unable to 
account for include social benefits and neighborhood revitalization promoted 
by the community activities taking place on the 157 lots.
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STATUS QUO     
 Y1 Y5 Y10 Total
Status Quo Revenue
Lots Leased 0 0 0 0
Revenue  $            -   $            -   $            -   $            -   
Status Quo Costs
Insurance ($7,850) ($8,835) ($10,242) ($89,991)
Maintenance ($70,650) ($79,517) ($92,182) ($809,923)
Total Status Quo Costs ($899,915)
Total Status Quo Net Income/Loss ($78,500) ($88,352) ($102,425) ($899,915)
WITH LOT LEASING PAY FOR 
PERFORMANCE STRATEGY     
 Y1 Y5 Y10 Total
Revenue With Lot Leasing Pay for Performance Strategy
Lots Leased 30 157 157 157
Revenue $7,500 $42,485 $46,907 $346,049 
Costs With Lot Leasing Pay for Performance Strategy
Insurance ($6,350) $ - $ - ($16,921)
Maintenance ($57,150) $ - $ - ($152,290)
Total Costs with Lot Leasing Strategy    ($169,211)
Net Income/ Loss with Lot Leasing ($56,000) $42,485 $46,907 $176,838 
Overall Cost Savings and Revenues $22,500 $130,838 $149,332 $1,076,753 
PAYMENT TO INTERMEDIARY (at 25% 
of combined revenue and cost savings) ($5,625) ($32,709) ($37,333) ($269,188)
ADJUSTED NET INCOME/LOSS $16,875 $98,128 $111,999 $807,564 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
 *This model assumes that the intermediary would enter 157 of the 300 expropriated and ad-
judicated properties under study into community partnerships over the first five years of the lot 
leasing program.  It assumes that NORA’s maintenance costs per lot are $500 per year and that 
revenues for lots leased are $250 per year. Revenues are increased at 2% per year and costs 
are increased at 3% per year.
 **This model assumes that lots put into community partnerships will remain in community part-
nerships for the duration of the ten-year period, when in reality the length of time lots remain in 
community partnerships may vary.
Source: UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analyisis
Table 4: Potential Revenue and Cost Savings From Lot Leasing
NEXT STEPS
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Through our research and analysis, we developed four strategies, as seen 
below in Map 5, to support NORA’s mission to reduce blight and revitalize 
neighborhoods in New Orleans. These strategies—title clearance for sale at 
auction, clustered redevelopment, stormwater management, and lot easing-
-involve varying levels of commitment and funding by NORA, as well as rela-
tionship-building with investors, intermediaries, and other partners. We recom-
mend SIB-financing for clustered development and stormwater management 
and a performance-based contract for title clearance and lot leasing. In order 
to make these strategies actionable, we detail the next steps needed to initiate 
their successful implementation. 
Strategy I – Title Clearance for Sale at Auction
In order to implement Strategy I, NORA should first conduct its own ad-hoc 
market valuation analysis in order to confirm that the potential sale prices of 
the 43 lots included in Strategy I can adequately cover the estimated $17,000 
per lot, title clearance costs. Although historically, lots in these relatively strong 
markets sell for prices in excess of $17,000, as indicated by NORA’s recent 
auction history, the sale prices can be highly variable on a per lot basis. Given 
NORA’s more detailed knowledge of the real estate markets in which these 
lots are located, the agency should be equipped to conduct an in-house, high 
level market valuation analysis to estimate the potential sales prices of these 
lots. Alternatively, NORA could commission a private firm to conduct a study, 
although doing so would, of course, present additional costs. 
Once NORA has confirmed the number of and location of lots that it wishes 
to include in this strategy, the agency should craft a Request for Proposals 
(RFP) that details the services required of a title agency, as well as the pay-
ment structure of the pay-for-performance contract. Again, these services 
will include title clearance—a relatively straight forward process for expropri-
ated properties—and NORA will cover the costs of the court fees. NORA may 
want to first reach out to the title attorneys with which the agency has existing 
relationships, in order to gauge their willingness to engage in a pay-for-perfor-
mance contract in which their payment is tied to the sale of the lots. 
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Strategy II – Clustered Redevelopment
Just as NORA will likely need to draw on its own resources to conduct the 
market valuation necessary to confirm sales prices of the properties in Strat-
egy I, it should also do so for confirming the location of and number of proper-
ties in the redevelopment clusters for Strategy II. More generally, NORA may 
want to consider re-defining the clusters identified for catalytic redevelopment, 
so as to include some LLT lots. Doing so could help increase the scale of the 
project, refine the geographic boundaries of the clusters to be more in line 
with market demand as assessed by NORA, and help to remove additional 
lots from NORA’s inventory. For instance, the Florida/St.Claude neighbor-
hood has relatively high property values and dozens of LLT lots, but it has the 
smallest cluster—only 4—of non-LLT properties. By incorporating 10-15 of the 
LLT properties located geographically within the boundaries of the Florida/St. 
Claude cluster into this strategy, NORA could remove these properties from 
its inventory while also providing its development partner and the investor with 
greater participation incentives. Both the development partner and the inves-
tor will be attracted to the larger scale of the project, and because these prop-
erties can sell at relatively high rates, their inclusion will increase both entities’ 
return on investment (ROI).
 
Once NORA has solidified its priority clusters for redevelopment, it should 
begin reaching out to potential development partners and investors. Prior to 
issuing a formal RFP, NORA may want to informally approach developers 
whom the agency has worked with in the past, or institutional investors and 
foundations with which NORA has an existing relationship. Again, we recom-
mend that NORA approach the Ford Foundation, which continues to be active 
in real estate based philanthropy in New Orleans, and Goldman Sachs, which 
has aggressively pursued and promoted the SIB model elsewhere.
Strategy III – Stormwater Management
NORA has an existing relationship with the S&WB.  The first step in initiating 
a stormwater management SIB is to expand this relationship by approaching 
the S&WB regarding the SIB model. NORA may want to informally reach out 
to the S&WB initially, to gauge their interest in taking on stormwater mainte-
nance responsibilities for additional lots (those identified lots in the Desire/ 
St. Roch and the Lower Ninth Ward Communities). NORA should consider 
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presenting the S&WB staff with this report or a brief overview of its findings 
introducting the SIB concept and the potential benefits that a SIB-financed 
stormwater management program could provide for both entities.
If the S&WB expresses interest, NORA should pursue conversations with po-
tential investors and service providers. The study team identified GNO, Inc., 
and the Greater New Orleans Foundation as potential investors for a storm-
water management SIB, and Waggoner & Ball Architects and LSU School of 
Architecture as prospective service providers. NORA could make the initial 
introductions between key personal at these organizations; it will be up to the 
S&WB, however, as the intermediately, to engage formally with the investors 
and service providers.
Strategy IV – Lot Leasing
The first step initiating a pay-for-performance model that expands upon the 
Growing Green program is to pursue conversation with potential green in-
termediaries. NORA could begin by approaching its existing, mission-driven 
intermediary, and informally assessing whether the intermediary—if given 
additional incentives—has the resources necessary to expand the program. 
If not, the next step in implementing this strategy would be for NORA to write 
and issue a RFP for a new green intermediary.
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APPENDIX B – LIST OF REPORT INTERVIEWS
Auw, Jeremy. Planning Student, Harvard University. SIBs and blight in Detroit. Brooke  
 Perry. 3 April 2014. Phone interview.
Brown, Christina. Clinical Professor, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.  
 Utilizing law students for title clearance. Joe Legaux. 7 April 2014. In person  
 interview.
Bush, Phillip. Senior Program Director of Advisory Services at Enterprise Community  
 Partners. Information on the financing of blight remediation. 24 March 2014.  
 Phone Interview.
Chaskel, Sebastian. Program Manager, SIB Lab at Harvard University John F. 
 Kennedy School of Government. Information from SIB Lab. Karl Tear. 26 Febru 
 ary 2014. Phone interview.
Graves, Jerry. Director of Land Stewardship, New Orleans Redevelopment Authority.  
 Gathering information from NORA on alternative land management. Tierra An 
 thony, Bryant Dixon and Jessica Fisch. 20 March 2014. In-person interview.
Howenstine, Laurie. Title Attorney at Elkins, PLC. Information on the process of title  
 clearance and laws. Rachael Bauer, et al. 27 March 2014. In person interview.
Knudsen, Seth and David Lessinger. Project Manager and Director of Planning and  
 Strategy, New Orleans Redevelopment Authority. Gathering information from  
 New Orleans Redevelopment Authority. Jessica Fisch, et al. 26 March 2014. In  
 person interview.
Littlefield, Casey.  Associate at Social Finance. Brooke Perry. 20 March 2014. Phone  
 interview.
Perry, Erin. Executive Assistant at Nashville Downtown Partnership. Courtney Smith.  
 28 February 2014. Phone interview.
Roman, John. Senior Fellow at Justice Policy Center. Potential for SIBs in place-  
 based initiatives. Karl Tear. 7 March 2014. Phone interview.
Snyderman, Robin and Karen Muchin. Principals at BRicK Partners, LLC. BRicK Part 
 ners' interest in social impact bonds. Joe Legaux and Brooke Perry. 25 Febru 
 ary 2014. Phone Interview.
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Location Property Type Sale Price
2514 S Derbigny Structure $53,000 (Above Claiborne)
2613 S Saratoga Lot $10,000 (Below Claiborne)
2618 S Saratoga Lot $9,000 (Below Claiborne)
2818 St. Andrew Structure $12,000
2844 Dryades Lot $20,000
70113 Average Damaged Sale 
2013 $24,000
70125 Average Damaged Sale 
2013 $57,685
Price for Model (Average) $26,526
St. Claude Sold Properties
Location Property Type Sale Price
2333 Pauline Structure $23,000
4523 Urquhart Structure $35,000
1707 Congress Structure $32,000
1503 Lesseps Structure $22,000
70117 Average Damaged Sale 
2013 $57,537
Price for Model (Average) $33,907
APPENDIX C - COMPARABLE PROPERTY SALE PRICES
The team compiled potential sale prices using recent NORA auction prices 
and zip code data from the New Orleans Metropolitan Association of Realtors 
between March 23, 2014 and Nov. 2, 2013. An average of several lots and the 
average sale price of damaged homes in Central City is $26,526 per lot. The 
St. Claude area should warrant an average of $33,907 per lot. The 7th Ward/
St. Roch section warrants $32,587 per lot. The team could not recover data 
on any recent Algiers’ auctions so the $32,587 price was determined based 
solely off zip code data.
Central City Sold Comparables
Appendix C
Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds
7th Ward Sold Comparables
Location Property Type Sale Price
2115 Mandeville Structure $20,000
2133 Port Structure $17,000
1615 St. Roch Structure $38,000
70116 Average Damaged Sale 
2013
$55,350
Price for Model (Average) $32,587
Algiers Sold Comparables
Location Sale Price
70114 Average Damaged Sale 2013 $43,216
Price for Model $43,216
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Type Identifier File Address Owner Name 2014 Total Value Tax Bill Number
Adjudicated NOR900354 2200 GORDON ST
WARREN E J JR;  
WARREN JOYCE;  
WARREN TROY;  
CYPRIAN DEBRA W
$3,800 39W510820
Adjudicated NOR900389 2122-2124 PAUGER ST HUDSON JOHN R $8,100 37W105817
Adjudicated NOR900412 3621-3623 THIRD ST DIGGS PETER $33,900 412404623
Adjudicated NOR900413 3617-3619 THIRD ST DIGGS PETER $8,700 412404616
Adjudicated NOR900414 3625-3627 THIRD ST SUTTON RICHARD $9,300 412404618
Adjudicated NOR900503 1718-1720 ST. ANN ST
WOMEN 
ENTREPRENEURS 
FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT INC
$910 207106910
Adjudicated NOR900518 4521 FLAKE AVE DUNN WILL D  DUNN DELEGER B $6,100 39W907711
Adjudicated NOR900553 1520 CLOUET ST LAWRENCE ADORA G $1,020 39W400620
Adjudicated NOR900558 701 ANDRY ST WINFREY HENRY S $1,020 39W109527
Adjudicated NOR900598 3215 RABBITS ST NORA $420 38W209102
Adjudicated NOR900620 47538 FORSTALL ST (1718 FORSTALL) NORU $390 39W409605
Adjudicated NOR900628 4517-4519 ROBERTSON ST NORU $9,440 614332709
Adjudicated NOR900631 48146 LIZARDI ST LELONG F RIVERS $530 39W502221
Adjudicated NOR900697 2441 DELERY NORU $550 39W604312 
Adjudicated NOR900720 1628 FORSTALL ST Ulmer Charles $390 39W405307 
Expropriated NOR900334 1217 S SARATOGA ST NORA $ 13,000 102107107
Expropriated NOR900335 1308 S SARATOGA ST NORA $ 26,500 102106809
Expropriated NOR900336 2066 N JOHNSON ST NORA $ 1,800 37W112925
Expropriated NOR900339 6437 MARQUE ST NORA $ 4,200 39W212515
Expropriated NOR900340 2412 CLARA ST NORA $690 412304706
Expropriated NOR900341 2919 GRAVIER ST NORA $18,000 105203603
Expropriated NOR900343 3209 GRAVIER ST NORA $18,800 105205903
Expropriated NOR900344 1213 N ROCHEBLAVE ST NORA $5,800 208108118
Expropriated NOR900345 2413 GRAVIER ST NORA $24,500 105201404
Expropriated NOR900346 1320 WILLOW ST NORA $1,600 102201809
Expropriated NOR900347 2008 SPAIN ST NORA $8,100 38W110514
Expropriated NOR900348 3221 SECOND ST NORA $16,700 412401913
Expropriated NOR900353 3108 GRAVIER ST NORA $30,000 104106818
Expropriated NOR900355 50330 FLORIDA AVE NORA $2,000 39W615332
Expropriated NOR900356 1131 S DUPRE ST NORA $7,000 102205401
Expropriated NOR900357 3101 PINE ST NORA $10,800 615314321
Expropriated NOR900358 3107-3109 PINE ST NORA $10,800 615314320
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Type Identifier File Address Owner Name 2014 Total Value Tax Bill Number
Expropriated NOR900359 3111 PINE ST NORA $10,800 615314319
Expropriated NOR900360 1221 S SARATOGA ST NORA $13,100 102107106
Expropriated NOR900361 3619-3621 FOURTH ST NORA $107,800 412404515
Expropriated NOR900365 2421 FLOOD ST NORA $12,900 39W605713
Expropriated NOR900366 2536-2538 PALMYRA ST NORA $20,700 105201734
Expropriated NOR900367 2404-2406 CHARBONNET ST NORA $5,400 39W605515
Expropriated NOR900368 2618 S SARATOGA ST NORA $5,600 412203519
Expropriated NOR900369 2044 HOPE ST NORA $14,100 37W212607
Expropriated NOR900371 3826-3828 THIRD ST NORA $9,200 412405724
Expropriated NOR900372 3212 JACKSON AVE NORA $15,300 412402404
Expropriated NOR900373 3219 JACKSON AVE NORA $15,000 412402305
Expropriated NOR900374 3600 SECOND ST NORA $9,000 412404610
Expropriated NOR900375 2311-2313 S ROMAN ST NORA $13,100 412402023
Expropriated NOR900377 1340 HARRISON AVE NORA $5,400 37W419524
Expropriated NOR900378 3231 JACKSON AVE NORA $18,000 412402304
Expropriated NOR900379 50189 FLOOD ST NORA $6,400 39W613603
Expropriated NOR900380 3331-3333 FIRST ST NORA $18,400 412402413
Expropriated NOR900381 2141 ST. MAURICE AVE NORA $14,600 39W510009
Expropriated NOR900382 5926 N DERBIGNY ST NORA $5,200 39W404306
Expropriated NOR900384 2022 ALABO ST NORA $6,100 39W514918
Expropriated NOR900385 2130-2132 ALABO ST NORA $6,100 39W514719
Expropriated NOR900386 2715-2717 S MIRO ST NORA $14,800 412404413
Expropriated NOR900387 3200 JACKSON AVE NORA $21,300 412402427
Expropriated NOR900391 1616-1618 ANDRY ST NORA $6,200 39W405018
Expropriated NOR900392 6228 N GALVEZ ST NORA $7,300 39W503610
Expropriated NOR900393 1730-1732 FRENCHMEN ST NORA $98,900 37W109812
Expropriated NOR900395 2307-2309 DESIRE ST NORA $6,800 39W600818
Expropriated NOR900396 1219-1221 TOURO ST NORA $8,400 37W104006
Expropriated NOR900397 4220 ERATO ST NORA $6,600 102209307
Expropriated NOR900398 3026-3028 FIRST ST NORA $61,400 412400513
Expropriated NOR900399 4200 N GALVEZ ST NORA $4,800 39W505210
Expropriated NOR900400 1549 N GALVEZ ST NORA $7,900 37W202208
Expropriated NOR900401 3400 JACKSON AVE NORA $10,000 412403516
Expropriated NOR900402 2402 REX PL NORA $9,500 412401217
Expropriated NOR900403 2321-2323 S ROMAN ST NORA $173,000 412402021
Expropriated NOR900405 2337 SEMINOLE PL NORA $7,500 412402117
Expropriated NOR900406 2515-2517 S MIRO ST NORA $8,700 412404609
Expropriated NOR900408 3328-3330 THIRD ST NORA $12,300 412402713
Expropriated NOR900409 3626 FOURTH ST NORA $14,700 412404407
Expropriated NOR900410 3234-3236 JACKSON AVE NORA $13,900 412402409
Expropriated NOR900417 2712 S ROCHEBLAVE ST NORA $173,000 412405308
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Expropriated NOR900418 2630-2632-2634 S. GALVEZ ST NORA $11,000 412403201
Expropriated NOR900419 1323-25 S DERBIGNY ST NORA $94,100 102203302
Expropriated NOR900420 3336-3338 FIRST ST NORA $9,600 412402508
Expropriated NOR900421 3313-3315 FIRST ST NORA $13,800 412402416
Expropriated NOR900422 2420-2422 GRAVIER ST NORA $16,000 104105422
Expropriated NOR900426 3332-3334 FIRST ST NORA $10,200 412402522
Expropriated NOR900429 2334-2338 CLOUET ST NORA $2,000 39W600404
Expropriated NOR900430 411 TOLEDANO ST NORA $12,300 411100207
Expropriated NOR900431 608 FOURTH ST NORA $12,600 411104402
Expropriated NOR900432 3421 MOMUS CT NORA $8,900 412403124
Expropriated NOR900434 2413 REX PL NORA $9,900 412401213
Expropriated NOR900435 3626 SECOND ST NORA $17,100 412404603
Expropriated NOR900436 1956 N PRIEUR ST NORA $140 37W110316
Expropriated NOR900442 3420 THIRD ST NORA $1,230 412403209
Expropriated NOR900444 2138 DESLONDE ST NORA $660 39W508713
Expropriated NOR900445 929-931 N VILLERE ST NORA $1,050 207105722
Expropriated NOR900446 2114 FRANCE ST NORA $620 39W508217
Expropriated NOR900453 4817 N VILLERE ST NORA $1,090 39W309223
Expropriated NOR900454 4401 MENDEZ ST NORA $1,920 39W025421
Expropriated NOR900455 4900 DREUX AVE NORA $2,100 39W929803
Expropriated NOR900456 2318 BIENVILLE ST NORA $2,500 206202706
Expropriated NOR900457 536 S TONTI ST NORA $2,420 105200610
Expropriated NOR900459 5067 DEBORE CIR NORA $2,810 39W930138
Expropriated NOR900460 5900 DEBORE DR NORA $1,620 39W023825
Expropriated NOR900462 6452 DEBORE DR NORA $1,710 39W023418
Expropriated NOR900465 5139 PAULINE DR NORA $2,610 39W930216
Expropriated NOR900470 2613 S SARATOGA ST NORA $810 412205309
Expropriated NOR900472 2755 ST. ANN ST NORA $3,500 207200237
Expropriated NOR900475 2415-17 ST. PHILIP ST NORA $5,640 208107704
Expropriated NOR900479 1312-1314 S ROMAN ST NORU $1,160 102203316
Expropriated NOR900481 2131-2133 EUTERPE ST NORU $380 101109419
Expropriated NOR900484 3413 MOMUS CT NORU $890 412403121
Expropriated NOR900486 3635 THIRD ST NORU $790 412404620
Expropriated NOR900488 1719 FLOOD ST NORA $690 39W410220
Expropriated NOR900494 5022 N ROBERTSON ST NORA $530 39W309015
Expropriated NOR900495 1500 CATON ST NORA $7,480 37W417020
Expropriated NOR900497 3226-3228 DELACHAISE ST NORA $5,660 614359711
Expropriated NOR900499 1631 N DORGENOIS ST NORA $340 37W210202
Expropriated NOR900500 1826 THIRD ST NORA $1,210 412201020
Expropriated NOR900505 3209-3211 DELACHAISE ST NORA $4,910 614360923
Expropriated NOR900506 1225 S RAMPART ST NORU $560 102106920
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Expropriated NOR900507 1300 CLARA ST NORU $970 102201709
Expropriated NOR900508 1304-1306 CLARA ST NORU $970 102201710
Expropriated NOR900509 1513-1515 ANDRY ST NORU $730 39W402819
Expropriated NOR900510 2012-2014 LASALLE ST NORU $1,160 412300416
Expropriated NOR900511 2313 ST. ANDREW ST NORU $7,100 412300318
Expropriated NOR900512 2315 WILLOW ST NORU $3,590 412306818
Expropriated NOR900513 2730-2732 THALIA ST NORU $940 101110915
Expropriated NOR900514 2817 THALIA ST NORU $620 102201822
Expropriated NOR900516 3705/09/11 WASHINGTON AVE NORU $5,380 412405301
Expropriated NOR900519 6319 PAULINE DR NORU $1,010 39W023617
Expropriated NOR900520 6538 PAULINE DR NORU $1,770 39W023229
Expropriated NOR900522 923-925 LIZARDI ST NORA $860 39W202505
Expropriated NOR900523 5027-5029 DAUPHINE ST NORA $1,510 39W111807
Expropriated NOR900524 5460 ROYAL ST NORA $1,900 39W104805
Expropriated NOR900526 2208 ST. ANN ST NORA $7,500 207108116
Expropriated NOR900529 5604-5606 DAUPHINE ST NORU $1,030 39W109702
Expropriated NOR900530 6118-6120 ST. CLAUDE AVE NORU $3,100 39W203924
Expropriated NOR900531 623 FLOOD ST NORU $1,210 39W104707
Expropriated NOR900532 920 FLOOD ST NORU $1,210 39W202720
Expropriated NOR900533 1921-1923 EGANIA ST NORA $610 39W502406
Expropriated NOR900534 2134 BIENVILLE ST NORA $680 206201913
Expropriated NOR900537 827-829 N ROCHEBLAVE ST NORA $2,260 207109128
Expropriated NOR900538 4716 URQUHART ST NORA $940 39W301813
Expropriated NOR900543 2419 IBERVILLE ST NORA $800 206203006
Expropriated NOR900544 2642-2644 PIETY ST NORA $340 39W615317
Expropriated NOR900545 2201 FELICIANA ST NORA $400 39W513301
Expropriated NOR900546 2339 S DERBIGNY ST NORA $1,660 412401117
Expropriated NOR900547 2430-2432 CLOUET ST NORA $440 39W607625
Expropriated NOR900548 2226 FELICIANA ST NORA $450 39W513410
Expropriated NOR900549 1325 ANDRY ST NORA $960 39W306720
Expropriated NOR900554 2414 SPAIN ST NORA $1,700 38W203116
Expropriated NOR900555 2620 TENNESSEE ST NORA $830 39W616727
Expropriated NOR900556 3936 TOLEDANO ST NORA $1,040 614361407
Expropriated NOR900563 2221 IBERVILLE ST NORA $2,500 206202215
Expropriated NOR900564 2708-2710 S DERBIGNY ST NORA $870 412400209
Expropriated NOR900565 2543 ORLEANS AVE NORA $7,000 207109211
Expropriated NOR900566 1031 EGANIA ST NORU $720 39W204917
Expropriated NOR900568 3415 CLOUET ST NORU $380 39W719114
Expropriated NOR900569 4317 MENDEZ ST NORA $2,070 39W025434
Expropriated NOR900570 6307 PAULINE DR NORA $1,190 39W023619
Expropriated NOR900571 1214-1216 FLOOD ST NORA $560 39W301005
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Expropriated NOR900572 1930 ANDRY ST NORA $610 39W502416
Expropriated NOR900573 2136 PAINTERS ST NORA $560 38W111411
Expropriated NOR900574 2508 PAINTERS ST NORA $2,300 38W203814
Expropriated NOR900577 5722 PEOPLES NORA $1,350 38W410519
Expropriated NOR900580 4711 ARTHUR DR NORA $1,080 39W934915
Expropriated NOR900581 1704 EGANIA ST NORU $550 39W409822
Expropriated NOR900582 1908 REYNES ST NORU $830 39W513719
Expropriated NOR900584 3038 FELICIANA ST NORU $350 39W709606
Expropriated NOR900585 3417 CLOUET ST NORU $380 39W719116
Expropriated NOR900587 5014 N DERBIGNY ST NORU $560 39W405321
Expropriated NOR900588 5029 ST. CLAUDE AVE NORU $710 39W209801
Expropriated NOR900589 636 LIZARDI ST NORU $710 39W105111
Expropriated NOR900591 911 LIZARDI ST NORU $860 39W202502
Expropriated NOR900593 3048 LOUISA ST NORA $330 39W709326
Expropriated NOR900594 3201 LOUISA ST NORA $300 39W713801
Expropriated NOR900595 3226 LOUISA ST NORA $330 39W713912
Expropriated NOR900596 3232 LOUISA ST NORA $330 39W713911
Expropriated NOR900600 1214 CHARBONNET ST NORU $360 39W300714
Expropriated NOR900601 1225 FLOOD ST NORU $960 39W300911
Expropriated NOR900602 1259 TENNESSEE ST NORU $860 39W212827
Expropriated NOR900603 1318 FLOOD ST NORU $640 39W306709
Expropriated NOR900604 1407 JOURDAN AVE NORU $700 39W309204
Expropriated NOR900605 1432 JOURDAN AVE NORU $530 39W311401
Expropriated NOR900606 1739-1741 EGANIA ST NORU $1,030 39W409910
Expropriated NOR900607 1802-1804 EGANIA ST NORU $540 39W412222
Expropriated NOR900608 2031 LAHARPE ST NORU $4,880 37W201501
Expropriated NOR900609 5410 URQUHART ST NORU $610 39W301208
Expropriated NOR900610 5433 MARAIS ST NORU $1,070 39W301001
Expropriated NOR900612 1440 AVIATORS ST NORA $2,440 37W532212
Expropriated NOR900613 5401 CONGRESS DR NORA $3,050 39W024801
Expropriated NOR900616 1405 JOURDAN AVE NORU $700 39W309203
Expropriated NOR900617 1410 EGANIA ST NORU $900 39W308803
Expropriated NOR900618 46512 CHARBONNET ST NORU $600 39W308208
Expropriated NOR900619 1503 LESSEPS ST NORU $3,320 39W401901
Expropriated NOR900621 2104 S JOHNSON ST NORU $1,500 412402308
Expropriated NOR900622 2517 WASHINGTON AVE NORU $1,260 412303201
Expropriated NOR900623 2701 S PRIEUR ST NORU $810 412402817
Expropriated NOR900624 2703 MISTLETOE ST NORU $680 716325805
Expropriated NOR900626 3333-3335 FELICIANA ST NORU $360 39W714615
Expropriated NOR900627 4032 VELIE ST NORU $200 39W800801
Expropriated NOR900629 47750 ANDRY ST NORU $1,240 39W412121
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Expropriated NOR900630 4795801 JOURDAN AVE NORU $670 39W415002
Expropriated NOR900633 5006 N ROMAN ST NORU $660 39W409613
Expropriated NOR900635 5425 N VILLERE ST NORU $840 39W308630
Expropriated NOR900636 5434 N ROMAN ST NORU $580 39W410008
Expropriated NOR900637 8828 BELFAST ST NORU $4,140 716323314
Expropriated NOR900643 1427 URSULINES NORA $1,660 208104006
Expropriated NOR900649 2700 PAINTERS ST NORA $540 38W205701
Expropriated NOR900653 2322 EADS ST NORA $1,080 38W202109
Expropriated NOR900654 2709 ARTS ST NORA $670 38W205717
Expropriated NOR900658 5515 SEMINARY PL NORA $4,380 39W026827
Expropriated NOR900660 6894 PARC BRITTANY NORA $940 39W069908
Expropriated NOR900661 2114 BENTON NORU $530 39W509621
Expropriated NOR900662 2133-35 BENTON NORU $990 39W509703
Expropriated NOR900663 2217 GORDON NORU $460 39W510714
Expropriated NOR900664 2245-47 BENTON NORU $380 39W510908
Expropriated NOR900665 2300 BENTON NORU $380 39W602919
Expropriated NOR900666 2305 BENTON NORU $340 39W603002
Expropriated NOR900667 2314 BENTON NORU $340 39W602909
Expropriated NOR900668 2320-22 BENTON NORU $670 39W602908
Expropriated NOR900669 2323-25 BENTON NORU $340 39W603005
Expropriated NOR900670 2333 BENTON NORU $340 39W603009
Expropriated NOR900671 2428 BENTON NORU $340 39W605109
Expropriated NOR900672 2241-43 BENTON NORU $340 39W510919
Expropriated NOR900673 2441 BENTON NORU $340 39W605005
Expropriated NOR900674 2326-28 BENTON NORU $340 39W602916
Expropriated NOR900675 2125-27 BENTON NORU $1,500 39W509709
Expropriated NOR900676 1935 CAFFIN NORU $620 39W502809
Expropriated NOR900677 1941 CAFFIN NORU $620 39W502810
Expropriated NOR900678 2043 CAFFIN NORU $480 39W504126
Expropriated NOR900679 2125 CAFFIN NORU $620 39W509507
Expropriated NOR900680 1703 CHARBONNET NORU $610 39W410501
Expropriated NOR900681 1713 CHARBONNET NORU $610 39W410504
Expropriated NOR900682 1827 CHARBONNET NORU $610 39W415106
Expropriated NOR900683 1906 CHARBONNET NORU $710 39W514220
Expropriated NOR900684 1919 CHARBONNET NORU $1,210 39W515004
Expropriated NOR900685 2216 CHARBONNET NORU $820 39W514116 
Expropriated NOR900686 2413 CHARBONNET NORU $610 39W617004 
Expropriated NOR900687 2419 CHARBONNET NORU $610 39W617005 
Expropriated NOR900688 2427 CHARBONNET NORU $610 39W617007 
Expropriated NOR900689 2527 CHARBONNET NORU $610 39W617107 
Expropriated NOR900690 2542 CHARBONNET NORU $540 39W610712 
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Expropriated NOR900691 2423 DELERY NORU $550 39W604314 
Expropriated NOR900692 2227 GORDON NORU $460 39W510716 
Expropriated NOR900693 2306 GORDON NORU $340 39W603120 
Expropriated NOR900694 2334 GORDON NORU $340 39W603114 
Expropriated NOR900695 2440-42 GORDON NORU $340 39W604904 
Expropriated NOR900696 2535 GORDON NORU $460 39W611409 
Expropriated NOR900698 1312-14 GORDON NORU $600 39W307203 
Expropriated NOR900699 2033 GORDON NORU $600 39W503803 
Expropriated NOR900700 2422 GORDON NORU $340 39W604919 
Expropriated NOR900701 2510 CHARBONNET NORU $540 39W610720 
Expropriated NOR900702 2511 CHARBONNET NORU $610 39W617104 
Expropriated NOR900703 2329 DELERY NORU $640 39W603605 
Expropriated NOR900704 1630 GORDON NORU $520 39W404307 
Expropriated NOR900705 6421 MARQUE NORU $420   39W212512 
Expropriated NOR900706 2242 TRICOU NORU $680 39W510523 
Expropriated NOR900707 2433 TRICOU NORU $890 39W604412 
Expropriated NOR900708 5842 WHIPPLE NORU $850 39W610809 
Expropriated NOR900709 1329-31 GOV. NICHOLLS NORA $27,070 208103608 
Expropriated NOR900712 40735 MAYO ROAD NORU $22,820 39W016010 
Expropriated NOR900718 2132 BENTON ST NORU $530 39W509617 
Expropriated NOR900719 1214801 MURL ST NORU $8,750 513514314 
Expropriated NOR900722 1514 ODEON NORA $8,500 513702906 
Expropriated NOR900725 919-29 N ROCHEBLAVE NORA $480 207109029 
Expropriated NOR900731 2001 THALIA ST NORA $14,710 102106814 
Expropriated NOR900736 2325 BENTON ST NORA $540 39W603006 
Expropriated NOR900857 2436-2438 GRAVIER ST NORU $7,390 104105418 
Expropriated NOR900859 648 S GAYOSO ST NORU $1,720 105203605 
Expropriated NOR900860 314-316 N PRIEUR ST NORU $3,000 206201007 
Expropriated NOR900861 419-421 N PRIEUR ST NORU $1,670 206201621 
Expropriated NOR900865 5016 MITHRA ST NORA $1,430 39W024507 
Expropriated NOR900868 1031 BELLEVILLE ST NORU $1,150 513207606 
Expropriated NOR900869 1220 BELLEVILLE ST NORU $1,440 513302605 
Expropriated NOR900870 1228 BELLEVILLE ST NORU $1,130 513302607 
Expropriated NOR900871 518 DIANA ST NORU $1,230 513207811 
Expropriated NOR900872 1301 ELMIRA AVE NORU $1,080 513304022 
Expropriated NOR900873 1052101 ELMIRA AVE NORU $1,980 513205716 
Expropriated NOR900874 422 HOMER ST NORU $2,030 513204515 
Expropriated NOR900875 509 HOMER ST NORU $2,050 513205303 
Expropriated NOR900876 839 BELLEVILLE ST NORU $1,920 513204210 
Expropriated NOR900877 819 HOMER ST NORU $1,940 513205621 
Expropriated NOR900878 1102701 LEBOEUF ST NORU $1,100 513304509 
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Expropriated NOR900879 1205 LEBOEUF ST NORU $800   513302302 
Expropriated NOR900880 1519 LEBOEUF ST NORU $1,340 513307912 
Expropriated NOR900881 1306 PTOLEMY ST NORU $660 513305410 
Expropriated NOR900882 1308 PTOLEMY ST NORU $660 513305411 
Expropriated NOR900883 1014 TECHE ST NORU $2,290 513207902 
Expropriated NOR900884 1100 VALLETTE ST NORU $1,150 513300701 
Expropriated NOR900885 1202 LEBOEUF ST NORU $680 513302201 
Expropriated NOR900886 615 NEWTON ST NORU $340 513207717 
Expropriated NOR900887 416 NEWTON ST NORU $1,980 513205221 
Expropriated NOR900888 1231 NUNEZ ST NORU $920 513303009 
Expropriated NOR900889 827 VERRET ST NORU $770 513204411 
Expropriated NOR900890 831 VERRET ST NORU $870 513204410 
Expropriated NOR900891 341 SLIDELL ST NORU $1,320 513204609 
Expropriated NOR900892 1102301 THAYER ST NORU $1,070 513304412 
Expropriated NOR900893 834 ELMIRA AVE NORU $1,260 513204016 
Expropriated NOR900894 900 ELMIRA AVE NORU $2,020 513205715 
Expropriated NOR900895 909 HOMER ST NORU $1,950 513205720 
Expropriated NOR900896 9050001 ELMIRA ST NORU $1,460 513205627 
Expropriated NOR900897 1229-1231 BELLEVILLE ST NORU $560 513302703 
Expropriated NOR900898 1230 BELLEVILLE ST NORU $570 513302608 
Expropriated NOR900899 1066501 VERRET ST NORU $770 513207707 
Expropriated NOR900900 1338 NUNEZ ST NORU $1,410 513303808 
Expropriated NOR900901 3217 LAMARQUE ST NORU $780 513702413 
Expropriated NOR900902 3201 LAMARQUE ST NORU $400 513702408 
Expropriated NOR900903 3205 PTOLEMY ST NORU $770 513702930 
Expropriated NOR900963 1914-1916 FORSTALL ST NORU $390 39W502104 
Expropriated NOR900342 2102-10 ERATO ST NORA No Data No Data
Expropriated NOR900370 3914 ERATO ST NORA No Data No Data
Expropriated  3423-3425 FOURTH ST NORA No Data No Data
Expropriated NOR900424 3237-3239 FIRST ST NORA No Data No Data
Expropriated NOR900487 3829-3831 FOURTH ST NORU No Data No Data
Expropriated NOR900561 2600 GALLIER ST NORA No Data No Data
Expropriated NOR900590 724 LIZARDI ST NORU No Data No Data
Expropriated NOR900632 4820 N. JOHNSON ST NORU No Data No Data
Expropriated NOR900710 13001 I-10 SERVICE ROAD NORA No Data No Data
Source: Orleans Parish Assessor’s Office, UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analysis
Appendix D
Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds
APPENDIX E: GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Adjudicated properties: Properties being held due to delinquent taxes.
Expropriated properties: Properties acquired by the City of New Orleans 
because of blight and transferred to NORA.
Higher flood risk: Properties that have a flood risk higher than 66%.
Louisiana Land Trust (LLT) Properties: Properties transferred to NORA 
from the Louisiana Land Trust. These properties were acquired through the 
Road Home program after Hurricane Katrina. Property owners were offered 
the option to sell their homes to the state.
Lower flood risk: Properties that have a 33% or less chance of flooding.
Moderate flood risk: Properties that have a chance of flooding greater than 
33% and less than 66%.
Strong markets: Census blocks with an MVA classification of A, B, or C. 
Transitional markets: Census blocks with an MVA classification of D or E.
Weak markets: Census blocks with an MVA classification of F, G, or H.
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